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Abstract
I investigate the effects of population ageing on immigration policies. Voters’ attitude
towards immigrants depends on how the net gains from immigration are divided up in the
society by the fiscal policy. In the theoretical literature this aspect is treated as exogenous to
the political process because of technical constraints. This generates inconsistent predictions
about the policy outcome. I adopt a new equilibrium concept for voting models to analyse
the endogenous relationship between immigration and fiscal policies and solve this apparent
inconsistency. I show that the elderly and the poor have a common interest in limiting
immigration and in increasing public spending. This exacerbates the effects of population
ageing on public finances and results in a high tax burden on working age individuals and
further worsens the age profile of the population. Moreover, I show that if the share of elderly
population is sufficiently large, then a society is unambiguously harmed by the tightening in
the immigration policy caused by the demographic change. The implications of the model
are consistent with the patterns observed in UK attitudinal data and in line with the findings
of the empirical literature about migration.
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1
1 Introduction
What are the effects of population ageing on immigration policies? Do ageing societies tend
to impose excessive restrictions on the inflow of foreign workers and if so, why? Should we
expect an adjustment in immigration and spending policies to mitigate the impact of population
ageing on public finances? This paper attempts to answer these questions using a theoretical
model. In particular, I investigate why rapidly ageing countries - that arguably need more legal
immigration - are imposing increasing restrictions to the inflow of immigrant workers and how
this choice affects the tax burden faced by the working population. I also analyse the effects of
these policy changes on the welfare of current and future generations. The importance of these
questions is related to the vast fiscal effects of population ageing and immigration. The increase
in longevity implies rising costs for the public sector, in particular the ones of public pensions
and health care. The fall in the fertility rates causes an insufficient growth in the tax base. Both
result in a pressure on public finances and tax rates. Several scholars and policy makers suggest
that legal immigration can help in mitigating the effects of this problem, but this can happen
only if there is political support for an increasingly open immigration policy. This analysis is
therefore crucial to assess the fiscal soundness of ageing societies in the long run. Immigration
also have demographic, social and cultural implications. Hence the study of immigration policies
is also important to understand the evolution of the structure of our society in a broader sense.
1.1 Methods
In keeping with previous literature (Razin and Sadka, 1999), I analyse a political economy
model with overlapping generations, in which voters differ in their income and in their age. In
contrast with previous literature, however, I depart from a unidimensional policy space. Specif-
ically, in each period the society chooses a two-dimensional policy consisiting of an immigration
quota and of the provision of an imperfect public good. The elderly receive an exogenous public
pension that is financed by the tax revenues. The government budget is balanced, hence the
political choice determines the tax rate on labour income. The bi-dimensionality of the policy
allows one to model endogenously both the immigration policy and how the net fiscal benefits
from immigration are divided up in the society. In detail, if immigrants generate a fiscal surplus,
voters can employ it to increase public spending and/or to reduce taxes. The first choice mostly
benefits the elderly and the low-income individuals, while the second favours the high earners.
This implies that the way in which the net gains are divided up by the fiscal system is crucial to
correctly assess the attitude towards immigration of different groups of voters. An endogenous
analysis of both the immigration and the fiscal policy requires a bi-dimensional policy. Thus
the standard tools in the Political Economy literature - based on unidimensionality - cannot
be used to answer this question. In order to address this problem, I adopt a dynamic version
of the model of electoral competition and of the concept of coalitional equilibrium proposed in
Dotti (2015). In such theoretical framework simple ordinal preference restrictions are sufficient
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to deliver existence of equilibrium and sharp comparative static results on the policy outcome.
This is a consequence of a key restriction on the political process. Specifically, single politicians
cannot commit to any platform other than their ideal policies, but they can form coalitions to
enhance their ability to commit through internal agreements. Coalitions must be stable in equi-
librium, in the sense that no subcoalition has a strict incentive to deviate and propose a different
policy platform. I adopt this notion of equilibrium to study an overlapping generations model of
immigration and public spending. This allows me to analyse how shocks on the longevity and on
the fertility of the population affect immigration policy, public spending and the tax rate faced
by the working population.
1.2 Summary of Results
I show that the elderly and the low income individuals have a common interest in reducing
immigration and increasing public spending. Population ageing causes both an increase in the
political power of these groups and a pressure on the government budget due to the rising cost
of pensions. These two channels underpin the main results of this paper, which are as follows.
First, I show that, if the share of elderly is sufficiently large, a rise in the longevity and/or
a fall in the natural growth rate of the population cause a tightening in the immigration policy
and an increase in public spending. The reduced inflow of immigrant workers implies a reduction
in the tax base. This, together with the rise in public spending in public goods and pensions,
causes a sharp rise in the tax rate. Hence the political process tends to exacerbate the effects of
population ageing on public finances.
Second, the effects of demographic shocks tend to worsen with time. In detail, a reduction
in the immigration quota in the current period implies a change in the future age profile of the
population because immigrants are mostly young and have weakly higher fertility rates relative
to the natives. This causes further population ageing in the following periods and reinforces the
effects.
Third, if the share of retired population is sufficiently large, then the tightening in the immi-
gration policy generates a welfare loss for the society as a whole and harms the future generations.
These results suggest that ageing countries, that arguably need more immigration, tend to
reduce it instead. This causes vast and persistent welfare and demographic effects and can affect
the fiscal sustainability of the public sector in these countries.
1.3 Related Literature
Population ageing has been significant since the mid-twentieth century and it is expected to
have dramatic demographic consequences in the next decades (see Figure 1). On one hand
there are strong theoretical and empirical arguments in support of legal immigration as an
instrument to ensure the financial soundness of a rapidly ageing society (Razin and Sadka,
1999 and Dustmann and Frattini, 2014). On the other hand the recent political debate in many
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countries is dominated by the discussion about how to limit the inflow of foreigners by introducing
increasingly restrictive immigration policies. In many European countries this political agenda
has leaded to a substantial tightening of immigration restrictions from 1994 (Boeri and Brucker,
2005) as shown in Figure 2. About the USA, Ortega and Peri (2009) provide evidence of an
increase in the restrictiveness of immigration policy in the period 1994-2005. These trends in the
implemented policies are consistent with a widespread and increasing aversion to immigration
in those countries. Attitudinal data show that in the UK the share of citizens that would like
immigration into their country to decrease has risen from 72.8% to a staggering 79.1% during the
last 10 years (British Social Attitude Survey, 2003-2013). Moreover, the elderly are consistently
more averse to immigration relative to the young. In the UK 85.7% of the individuals aged 60
or over would like less immigration while 71.2% of the individuals under 40 years old share the
same opinion (British Social Attitude Survey, 2013). In the USA, the corresponding values are
47.3% and 39.2% (General Social Survey, 2014). These statistics suggest that population ageing
may play an important role in the collective choice about immigration policies.
The empirical studies of the determinants of immigration policy are mostly based on atti-
tudinal data and provide two main consistent facts that are relevant for this paper. The first
fact is that age, education and income have a significant impact on the disapproval of further
immigration and that in particular the elderly tend to have stronger preferences against further
immigration in comparison with the young. Dustmann and Preston (2007), Facchini and Mayda
(2007) and Card et al. (2011), using respectively data from the British Social Attitude Survey,
the International Social Survey Programme and the European Social Survey, all support this
finding. The latter paper also provides evidence that this result is mainly due to the perceived
effect of immigration on the composition of the community in which the respendents live (or
“compositional amenities”) and to its economic effects. The second important fact is that eco-
nomic hostility to immigration is driven by concern about effects on public finances at least as
much as by effects on labour market outcomes (Dustmann and Preston, 2006, 2007; Boeri, 2010).
Consistently with this finding, Milner and Tingley (2009) show that public finance aspects play
a major role in shaping the immigration policy in the US. This is somewhat surprising given
that there is not convincing empirical evidence about negative net effects of legal immigration on
public finances (Preston, 2014), and that on the contrary some studies suggest that legal immi-
grants may be net contributors to the fiscal system in several countries (Dustmann et al. 2010,
Dustmann and Frattini 2014). Lastly, the empirical literature about public spending provides
an important result for this analysis. That is, population ageing affects fiscal policies in two key
ways. On one hand there are direct effects - largely exogenous to the political process - due to
changes in the cost of pensions, health care and education (Banks and Emmerson, 2003). On
the other hand there is evidence that indirect political effects play an important role in shaping
spending policies (Persson and Tabellini, 1999; Galasso and Profeta, 2004). Accounting for these
two aspect is crucial to understand how demographic shocks affect the tax rates.
These three empirical findings justify some of the modelling choices of this paper. In particu-
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lar: (i) the choice of an overlapping generation model with a crucial role for the elderly in shaping
the equilibrium policy, (ii) the main role played by the political determination of tax rates and
public spending in shaping the attitudes of different individuals towards immigration, (iii) the
explicit account for the “compositional amenities” in the preferences of native individuals, (iv)
the inclusion of both exogenous and endogenous effects of ageing on the size of public spending.
The theoretical literature has analyzed the effects of population ageing on three political
outcomes that are crucial for this paper, namely: (i) the immigration policies, (ii) the public
spending policies, and how these two affect (iii) the tax policy (Razin and Sadka 1999, 2000, Razin
et al. 2002). The use of unidimensional models to study this problem (that is largely prevalent
in the literature) has constrained the analysis to a unique endogenous outcome variable. The
implication is that fiscal and immigration policies have been studied separately. This resulted
in two complementary streams of literature whose key trade-offs are going to be relevant in the
model proposed in this paper.
The first analyzes the political effects of ageing on public spending and intergenerational
redistribution. Persson and Tabellini (1999) show that in a simple overlapping generation model
the extent of intergenerational redistribution towards the elderly is increasing in the share of
elderly population, and Tabellini (1990), Lindert (1996) and Perotti (1996) provide a partial
empirical support to this hypothesis. Razin et al. (2002) propose a second channel: a larger
share of elderly implies a higher tax burden on the median voter, because it corresponds to a
lower share of taxpayers relative to the share of net benefit receivers. These two channels imply
opposite effects of ageing on the level of public spending in equilibrium: the pro-tax coalition
becomes larger but each taxpayer is relative less supportive of public spending.
The second stream of literature analyzes the determinants of immigration policy. If on one
hand some papers focus on immigration policies related to the quality of immigrants, such as skill
requirements (Benhabib, 1996 and Ortega, 2005), on the other hand the prevalent approach - of
which this paper is an example - analyses policies that restrict the number of immigrants such
as immigration quotas (see Preston, 2014 for a survey). These papers (Kemnitz, 2003; Krieger,
2003; Ben-Gad, 2012) emphasize the importance of intergenerational aspects such as the pension
system and the investment in education in explaining the determinants of the political choice
about immigration policies.
A crucial finding in this literature is that the unidimensionality assumption has important
consequences on the predictive power of these models. In particular, it generates inconsistent
predictions about the comparative statics of the outcome variable depending on the specific
restrictions that are imposed in order to satisfy the required condition. An example of these
paradoxical effects is described in Facchini and Mayda (2008, 2009) and Haupt and Peters (1998).
They study a simple economy characterized by a linear income tax and assume that revenues
are lump-sum rebated to all citizen. In this setting one may choose to meet the requirement
of unidimensionality by imposing the exogeneity of either (i) the level of public spending in
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benefits or of (ii) the income tax rate. These two assumptions corresponds respectively to the
classes of (i) “Tax adjustment models” (TAM, e.g. Scholten and Thum, 1996) and “Benefit
adjustment models” (BAM, e.g Razin and Sadka, 1999, 2000) and imply opposite predictions
about the relationship between pre-tax income, age and attitude towards immigration (Figure
1-2-3-4). Specifically, the first model implies that the elderly and the low income individuals are
more hostile to immigration than the young and high income, while the opposite is true in the
second model. The intuition that underpins these two apparently contradictory results lies in the
consequence of an increase in the legal inflow of immigrants. Consider for instance the case in
which immigrants are net contributors to the fiscal system. If publicly provided benefits are set
exogenously, then the effect of an increase in immigration is a fall in the tax rate. Conversely, if
the exogenous variable is the tax rate, then the effect is a rise in public spending per capita. As
a result, in the former case immigration benefits mostly the young and high income voters, while
in the latter the elderly and the low income individuals enjoy the largest share of the gains. In a
recent paper Preston (2014) clarifies that the source of this inconsistency lies in how the social
gains generated by immigration are divided up among different groups. This division is an output
of the political process, but existing models treat it as an input. The issue is even more relevant
for the purposes of this paper because I aim not only to understand the patterns of immigration
policy, but more generally to address how a democratic society responds to population ageing
in terms of immigration and fiscal policy, and the overall consequences on the public finances.
These questions can be addressed only in a framework that allows immigration, spending and
tax policy to be endogenously determined.
The theoretical literature has recognized the crucial importance of multidimensionality of
the policy space in order to study the determinants of immigration policies, but all the existing
studies are based on unidimensional models because of technical reasons. The early papers by
Plott (1967), Tullock (1967) and Devis et al. (1972) have established rather restrictive conditions
for the existence of a Condorcet Winner - a platform that is preferred to any alternative by a
majority of voters - if the policy space is multidimensional. Grandmont (1978) has elegantly
generalized these conditions with the concept of Intermediate Relations. The use of Grandmont’s
result in Political Economy applications is restricted to simple problems of redistribution (e.g.
Borge and Rattsø, 2004) because of the extreme constraints that it imposes on preferences’
heterogeneity. These requirements are way too restrictive for applications in which different
subgroups of the voting population (such as the working age and the retired individuals in this
paper) have sufficiently heterogeneous preferences over the set of available policies1.
Alternatives to unidimensional voting models are popular in the literature, but they are not
generally useful to answer questions about the comparative statics of the equilibrium policy
outcomes because they do not deliver sharp analytical predictions about the policy response to
a shock to the voters’ distribution. This can be due either to a large multiplicity of equilibria,
1In the supplementary material I provide an example of why the Grandmont conditions usually fail to apply
in this framework, and in particular to the model that I present in section 3 of this paper.
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like in the Citizen-Candidate models (Besley and Coate, 1997) and in the Party Unanimity Nash
Equilibrium (Roemer, 1999), or to the lack of sufficiently robust analytical comparative statics
results, like in Probabilistic Voting models (Lindbeck et al. 1987, Banks et al. 2003). A more
detailed analysis of the advantages and disadvantages of different theoretical framework in the
study of comparative statics in models of electoral competition is provided in Dotti (2015). An
attempt to model collective choices over immigration policies and welfare spending allowing for
a multidimensional policy space is in Razin et al. (2011, 2014). They characterize the type of
political coalitions that may prevail among skilled, unskilled and elderly voters in an overlapping
generation models that shares several features with the one proposed in this paper. Neverthless,
their approach is unsuitable to answer the questions of this paper, because of two reasons. First,
they assume exogenous tax rates. Thus, the implications in terms of preferences for immigration
are the same as the ones of Benefit adjustment models. Secondly, the assumptions they impose
to tackle the multidimensionality of the policy space severely limit the possibility of deriving
comparative statics results about the equilibrium policy outcome. This paper is based on another
stream of literature (Levy 2004, 2005) which exploits the role of coalitions and political parties in
ensuring stability in a multidimensional deterministic voting model. I adopt a dynamic version of
the model of electoral competition proposed by Dotti (2015). Such framework, under appropriate
preferences restrictions, delivers sharp predictions about the equilibrium policy outcome, and it
is therefore suitable to answer the questions of the paper.
1.4 Organization of the paper
The paper is organized as follows. In the next section I introduce the main model and an
equilibrium concept that allows me to answer the questions. Section 3 presents the main results
of the paper, which are stated in Theorems 7-8. In section 4 I propose four extensions of the
basic framework. In section 5 I analyze the welfare implications of the main predictions of the
paper. Section 6 provides an analysis of the determinants of the attitude towards immigration in
the UK based on the British Social Attitude Survey and show that they are consistent with the
one implied by the model proposed in this paper. Lastly, in section 7 I discuss some limitations
of this work and future directions of research.
2 A Political Model of Immigration and Spending Policy
This section is constituted by two parts. In the first I describe the features of the political
process. In the second I present the economic model of immigration and public spending and
I formally define the notion of equilibrium. These two theoretical tools are then used to derive
the main results of this paper, which are stated in section 3.
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2.1 The Political Process
I define a political process that translates individual preferences into a policy outcome xt in
each period t. The elements of the vector xt represent the relevant policy outcomes, namely the
immigration quota (Mt) and the uniform provision of an imperfect public good (Yt). I adopt
a dynamic version of the political model of electoral competition introduced in a companion
working paper (Dotti 2015). It is a general tool with a potentially large range of applicability,
some of which are mentioned in the concluding section of Dotti (2015). The closest example in
the literature is in Levy (2004, 2005). A formal definition of the equilibrium concept is provided
in section 2.3 (Definition 1), while a detailed description of the political process and its properties
in the static case is available in Dotti (2015).
The political process is based on the assumption that voters can form coalitions in order
to enhance their capacity to influence the policy outcome. Each individual can be the member
of only one coalition, thus a coalition structure is defined as a partition of the set of voters.
As in Levy (2005), a coalition can only offer credible policies, that is, policies in the Pareto
set of its members. Thus, when a voter runs as an individual candidate, he can only offer
his ideal policy, as in the “citizen-candidate” model. On the other hand, when heterogeneous
individuals join together in a coalition, their Pareto set is larger than the set of their ideal
policies. This assumption captures the idea that within a coalition individuals can commit to
policies that represents a compromise among the members, and that these internal agreements
are credible for the voting population provided that not all the members have an incentive to
renegotiate the terms of the deal. Individuals play a two stage game: in the first stage they
form coalitions in support of a certain proposed policy platform (or no policy) and in the second
stage a voting game is played over the set of policies that are proposed by at least one coalition
in the previous stage. Coalitions are required to be stable in equilibrium, in the sense that each
coalition must possess at least one policy vector in its Pareto set such that - if the policy is
proposed - there is no subcoalition that have a strict incentive to deviate and propose a different
platform (named a deviator in this case)2. If the deviation occurs the policy initially proposed
by the coalition may become unfeasible. Therefore the profitability of a deviation depends on
the behavior of the remaining part of the coalition that did not participate in the deviation.
I assume that this subgroup responds to the deviation by proposing a policy (if any) that is
capable of reducing the final payoff of some (or of all) the deviating players and therefore to
prevent the deviation, and no policy if such platform does not exist. It can be shown that
the main results of this section are robust to different assumptions about such behaviour (see
Dotti 2015). Moreover, I assume that the profitability of a deviation is determined by the final
outcome of the voting process3. Specifically, voters fully anticipate not only the effects of their
2One can also allow for mergers between coalitions with no effects on the results in Theorems 3-4-5.
3 Alternatively one can assume that the equilibrium choices of other coalitions do not affect the behavior of
potential deviators (in such case the stability is purely internal to the coalition), with no effects on the comparative
statics results, see Dotti (2015).
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strategies in the current period, but also the effects on the equilibrium in the following periods.
The latter effects are derived assuming rational expectations that satisfy the Markov property.
This means that expectations about future equilibrium outcomes depend uniquely on the state
of the economy in the current period. Details are provided in section 2.3. I assume a tie-breaking
rule for the case in which, given the other platforms that are offered in equilibrium, all members
of a given coalition are indifferent between offering a platform and running at all. Specifically,
I impose that in equilibrium a coalition facing such a situation does not propose any platform.
The same restriction is assumed in Levy (2005) and it is justified if one considers some small
costs of running for elections which are not explicitly assumed in the model. If there is at least
one policy in the Pareto set of a certain coalition that does not face any deviator, then this
policy is feasible and the coalition is stable. A stable coalition structure is a partition of the set
of voters in which all coalitions that are part of such partition are stable in the sense described
above. Before observing the coalition structure each coalition (including one-member coalitions)
propose either a feasible policy platform or no policy. Then the coalition structure and the
proposed platforms are observed by all the players. Voters (the whole population) vote one of
the available policy platforms and the election’s outcome is a weak Condorcet Winner, which I
name a winning policy. If no policy is offered or no weak Condorcet Winner exists, a default
policy is implemented which is worse for all players than any other outcome4. A set of platforms
(named a policy profile), a stable coalition structure and a winning policy given expectations
about future policy outcomes constitute a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium of the game
if one of the coalition is a (weak) Condorcet Winner of the voting game at the second stage
(see Dotti 2015). Notice that, differently from Levy (2005), I do not assume sincere voting: the
existence of a Condorcet Winner at the second stage of the voting game implies a result that is
robust to a fully sophisticated voting behavior and to a number of different voting protocols.
The main difficulty in applying the concept of coalitional equilibrium to the analysis in this
paper is related to the dynamic nature of the problem. Specifically, voters’ expectations about
the effects of current policy choices on future outcomes may affect the equilibrium behaviour.
Moreover, because of this dynamic aspect, multiple equilibria are, in principle, possible. However,
under appropriate restrictions on voters’ expectations, the analysis in each period t becomes
equivalent to the one of a static problem, as I am going to clarify in section 2.3. In the next
section I present the economic model of immigration that I adopt in this paper, and in section
2.3 I will provide sufficient conditions on voters’ expectations such model satisfy, in each period
t, the condition for a coalitional equilibrium.
4The comparative statics results apply even if the default policy is the platform implemented in the previous
period, see Appendix B.4.
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2.2 The Economic Environment
In this section I introduce an economic model of immigration and public spending in the spirit
of the ones in the literature, in particular of Razin and Sadka (1999). Differently from the latter,
I allow for the endogeneity of both the spending variable (an imperfect Public Good) and the
immigration policy (in the form of a quota in each period t).
2.2.1 Demographic Structure
Consider an overlapping generation model with three generations in each period t: the children
(ch), the working age population (y) and the elderly (o). In each period only the native indi-
viduals of working age and the elderly (which include both the native and immigrants of the
previous period) have voting rights (highlighted in capital letters in Fig. 7).
time
born
t− 3
born
t− 2
born
t− 1
born
t
born
t+ 1
t− 1 t t+ 1
OLD (o) → ×
NATIVE (n)
(y) → OLD (o) → ×
Immigrant (m)
Children (ch)
→ NATIVE (n)
(y) → OLD (o)
Immigrant (m)
Children (ch)
→ NATIVE (n)
(y)
Immigrant (m)
Children (ch)
Fig. 7. Structure of Overlapping Generations
Each period has length normalized to 1 and it is characterized by a native working age pop-
ulation of size nt and a number of immigrants mt in their working age. Natives and immigrants
have potentially different exogenous expected fertility rates denoted by σnt and σ
m
t respectively.
An elderly individual at time t has life expectancy lt−1 ≤ 1. At the end of each period immi-
grants and their children are fully assimilated to the native population in terms of costs and
fertility behavior. The size of each part of the population is summarized in Fig. 8. Denote
with ot the size of the elderly population, i.e. ot = lt−1(nt−1 + mt−1). Notice that ot is an
increasing function of longevity. This assumption captures in a simple way the implications of a
more realistic continuous time model5.
5In a continuous time model the number of elderly in each moment in time t is given by
´ 1+l
s=1 nt−s(s) +
mt−s(s)ds which is also linearly increasing in the longevity l and in the size of the oldest generation of elderly
nt−1−l(1 + l) +mt−1−l(1 + l).
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t− 1 t t+ 1
lt−2(nt−2 +mt−2) (o) → ×
nt−1 +mt−1 (y) → lt−1(nt−1 +mt−1) (o) → ×
σnt−1nt−1 + σ
m
t+1mt−1 (ch) → nt +mt (y) → lt(nt +mt) (o)
born σnt nt + σ
m
t mt (ch) → nt+1 +mt+1 (y)
born σnt+1nt+1 + σ
m
t+1mt+1 (ch)
Fig. 8. Size of each generation
Thus, the total number of individuals that possess voting rights at time t is Nt = nt + ot.
Also notice that the way in which I define the size of different groups in the population implies
a number of voters that is not necessarily a natural number, while in reality that must be the
case. Given that the object of this study are policies that are typically decided at country level,
and that the effects of this approximation tend to disappear as the number of individuals grows
large, these assumptions are reasonable and commonly used in the literature (e.g. Razin and
Sadka, 1999).
2.2.2 Individual Preferences
An individual i of working age (y) at time t has preferences that are represented by a utility
function whose arguments are consumption of private goods Cs and the imperfect Public Good
Ys, and the share of immigrants in the total population of working age Ms in the form:
U i,yt
(
Ci,yt , C
i,o
t+1,Mt,Mt+1, Yt, Yt+1
)
= Ci,yt + b(Yt)− c(Mt) + βlt
[
Ci,ot+1 + d(Yt+1)− cˆ(Mt+1)
]
where β is a parameter capturing how an individual discounts future utility. For retired individ-
uals U i,ot is constructed in a similar way, except that it only includes consumption and share of
immigrants in the current period of life:
U i,ot
(
Ci,ot ,Mt, Yt
)
= lt−1
[
Ci,ot + d(Yt)− cˆ(Mt)
]
The functions d, c and cˆ are restricted to take only weakly positive values. Moreover, b and d
are strictly concave while c and cˆ are strictly convex.
2.2.3 Production
Individual productivity is given by it and has average ¯t. The distribution of 
i
t is perfectly
observed by all agents and it does not change over time. I denote its continuous c.d.f. with Q,
its p.d.f. with q and I assume q(0) > 0. Immigrants have the same expected productivity as the
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natives. Individuals are endowed with 1 unit of time and their labour supply is perfectly inelastic.
I assume a linear production function Ft(Lt) = ξtLt in which the total supply of effective labour
is given by Lt = (mt + nt)¯t. Perfect competition on the labour market implies a wage rate per
unit of effective labour wt = ξt. Therefore individual pre-tax income is given by:
yit = wt
i
t
and has average y¯t. The assumption of inelastic labour supply simplifies the results and it is not
crucial for driving the pay-offs of the model (in the supplementary online material I show that
the results are identical if all individuals have the same tax elasticity of labour supply). The
assumption of a linear production function rules out the effects of changes in the aggregate labour
supply on wages and it is common in the literature (e.g. Razin and Sadka, 2000). It is justified if
one considers that in a more complex economy these effects tend to be offset by the adjustment
in the stock of capital of the economy - not explicitly assumed in this analysis - that occurs
in the relatively long time framework of a generation. This adjustment is particularly strong if
firms have access to international capital markets (see Ben-Gad, 2012). In the additional online
material I show that the main results of this paper are mostly unaffected in the case of a strictly
concave production function.
2.2.4 Public Finances
The public sector raises revenues through a linear tax τt on labour income and spend them in the
publicly provided good Yt and in pensions for the elderly. In section 4.3 I introduce an extension
of the model in which the government also provides public education. The government faces an
exogenous amount of forgone tax revenues λt = λ(wt) per immigrant. This assumption captures
the idea that the certain skills may be country-specific and therefore the immigrant may earn
less than native individuals with similar productivity levels. Alternatively one can assume that
immigrants and natives have different average productivities ¯mt , ¯
n
t , and λt to be a function
λ(wt, ¯
m
t , ¯
n
t ) that captures the net forgone government revenue due to the difference in income
6.
I assume a Pay-As-You-Go pension system (in section 4.1 I present an extension in which
I allow for a partially funded system). The state pension paid to an individual i at time t is
denoted by pit−1 and has average p¯t−1. It is promised to a working age individual at time t−1 and
it is predetermined at time t. It is a constant flow, such that the total transfer is lt−1pit−1 (the
flow amount times the time the pension is going to be paid for). It is a function of the relative
income of the pensioner in the previous period yit−1/y¯t−1 and of the growth rate of working age
population. At time t − 1, when the promise is made, mt is not yet determined, because it is
a function of the immigration policy at time t. Thus the promised pension is a function of an
6Notice that these two assumptions have consequences on the post-tax income of the immigrants
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exogenously fixed amount of immigrants mˆt (can be equal to zero). This assumption allows voters
to ease the burden of pension on the working age population by choosing an immigration quota
larger than mˆt. The assumptions on the pension system ensure that a certain positive amount
of pensions is provided even if the pivotal voter typically prefers no pensions at all. Although
not explicitly modeled in this paper, the assumption of an exogenous positive provision of public
pensions in an overlapping generation model is justified in a game theoretical framework like
the one in Rangel and Zeckhauser (2001). Lastly, two parameters α ≥ 0, γ ≥ 0 determine the
features of public pension system. In detail, the pension system can be either Beveridgean (if
γ = 0), Bismarckian (if α = 0) or a combination of the two. The state pension pit−1 is given by
the formula:
pit−1 =
(
α+ γ
yit−1
y¯t−1
)
nt + mˆt
nt−1 +mt−1
=
(
α+ γ
yit−1
y¯t−1
)
σ¯t−1
(1− M̂t)
where σ¯t−1 = nt(mt−1+nt−1) is the natural growth factor of the working population between period
t−1 and t and M̂t = mˆtnt+m̂t is the share of immigrants implied by the default level of immigration
m̂t. Notice that if native and immigrants have different birth rates, i.e. σ
n
t 6= σmt , then the natural
growth rate of the population σ¯t is itself endogenous in the immigration policy, and in particular:
σ¯t =
σnt nt+σ
m
t mt
nt+mt
= σmt Mt + σ
n
t (1−Mt). Lastly, notice that the total cost of the pension system
per taxpayer is decreasing in the number of immigrant workers that are allowed to enter the
country in period t, while pit is increasing in Mt−1 if σ
m
t−1 > σ
n
t−1.
I assume that the government budget is balanced in every period. The choice of not allowing
for public debt simplifies the analysis and does not affect the trade-offs of the model. The
government budget constraint ensure that the total public spending in public goods, pensions
and the costs of immigration do not exceed the total tax revenue, and has form:
Yt(mt + nt) + lt−1p¯t−1(mt−1 + nt−1) + λtmt ≤ τt(mt + nt)y¯t
Assume that the governmental budget constraint is satisfied with equality (it must be true at any
equilibrium of the voting game7). Using the formula for the pensions the governmental budget
constraint can be rewritten as follows:
τt = τ(Mt, Yt, y¯t) = y¯t
−1
(
λtMt + (α+ γ)lt−1
(1−Mt)
(1− M̂t)
+ Yt
)
Notice that this formula implies that working age voters can ease the tax burden on their income
by voting for a more open immigration policy. The intuitition is that, if the number of immigrants
increases, then the expenditure in pensions is going to be shared among a larger number of
taxpayers. This results in lower income taxes. I can use this formula to state the feasibility
7In the case in which the pivotal voter is retired or has zero income one has to rule out Pareto inferior outcomes
to ensure this result.
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condition of the policy space:
0 ≤ τt(Mt, Yt, y¯t) ≤ k
for some k < 1. This restriction ensures that the implied tax rate on income will not exceed 1
or becomes negative. Notice that this restriction is crucial for the results in the next section to
apply: if the tax rate hits the upper bound then the model and its predictions become similar to
the ones of a standard Benefit Adjustment Model (See Appendix B.5). It is easy to show that
the consumption of private goods of a young individual is given by her post-tax income such that
Ci,yt = (1− τt)yit. lastly, the consumption of old people at time t depends only on the amount of
pensions provided by the government, i.e. Ci,ot = p
i
t−1.
2.2.5 Policy Space
I assume that voters face a two-dimensional policy space in each period t. Namely, a policy
platform consist of an immigration policy Mt, and of a level of public spending in the imperfect
public good Yt. Moreover, I assume that both the immigration policy Mt and the spending
policy Yt lie between zero and an upper bound, i.e. 0 ≤ Mt ≤ M and 0 ≤ Yt ≤ Y . A typical
platform is given by a two dimensional vector xt = (x1t, x2t) with x1t = Mt and x2t = −Yt.
2.2.6 Voters’ Objective Function
Substituting the formulas for Cyt and C
o
t+1 into the utility function of a young voter one gets the
indirect utility function νi,yt = ν
y(Mt, Yt,Mt+1, Yt+1; y
i
t):
νi,yt = (1− τt)yit + b(Yt)− c(Mt) + βlt
[(
α+ γ
yit
y¯t
)
σ¯t
(1− M̂t+1)
+ d(Yt+1)− c(Mt+1)
]
The next step is to state the objective function of the elderly. Using the formula for Ci,ot into
the utility function of an elderly voter I get νi,ot = ν
o(Mt, Yt; y
i
t−1):
νi,ot = lt−1
[(
α+ γ
yit−1
y¯t−1
)
σ¯t−1
(1− M̂t)
+ d(Yt)− cˆ(Mt)
]
The formula above delivers the main intuition that underpins the results in this paper. Notice
that retired individuals internalize (indirectly) the positive effects of immigration through the
level of public spending in the imperfect Public Good. The key difference with traditional models
is that the tax rate on income is also an endogenous variable. Thus, the elderly always prefer,
given a certain level of public spending, a policy that finances it with high taxes on the income
of native workers rather than with a larger number of immigrants. This result follows from the
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fact that in this model the elderly dislike immigration as much as the young but, differently
from the latter, they do not internalize the negative effects of high taxes on the working age
population. Moreover, notice that the same preferences represented by νi,ot are also represented
by the function νot = d(Yt)− cˆ(Mt) for all the elderly at time t. This objective function implies
that the attitude of the elderly towards immigration is always more hostile than the one of
any working age individual. This is true even if immigrants are net contributors in financing
the public spending of which the elderly are net beneficiaries. This implication of the model is
consistent with the empirical findings outlined in section 1 and it is crucial in order to understand
the comparative statics of the equilibrium outcomes of the model that I will present in the next
sections of this paper. Define θi,yt as the ratio of i’s income to mean income at time t:
θi,yt =
it
¯t
=
yit
y¯t
The preferences of each young native individual i are uniquely identified by the parameter θi,yt ∈
Θyt with Θ
y
t = [θ
y
t , θ¯
y
t ]. Notice that the function ν
i,y
t can be written as function of one exogenous
parameter θi,yt and of the choice variables (Mt, Yt,Mt+1, Yt+1) at time t and t + 1, plus the
parameters ϕt = ({α, β, γ, σnt+s−1, σmt+s−1, lt+s−1}∞s=0). Moreover, the definition of θi,yt implies
that the cumulative distribution of θi,yt is the same as the one of 
i
t. The value of y
i
t−1/y¯t−1 does
not affect the preferences of an elderly individual j over xt, therefore all the elderly have the
same preferences. This means that we can set a unique parameter θj,ot = θ
o
t ∈ Θot which identifies
the preferences of each elderly individual j at time t such that Θot = {θot }. I assign to all the
elderly a parameter θot = −1. I can now define the parameter set:
Θt = {Θyt ∪Θot}
which is a totally ordered set. In order to show that the preferences described in this section
satisfy the conditions for the existence of a coalitional equilibrium I define a new objective
function that includes both νi,yt and ν
i,o
t and has the following form:
νit = ν(xt, xt+1; θ
i
t, ϕt) =
{
νi,yt if age = y
κνot if age = o
with x1t = Mt and x2t = −Y t and for an arbitrarily large κ > 0. Notice that κ represents a
strictly increasing transformation of the original objective function of the elderly therefore κνot
implies the same preferences as νot .
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2.3 Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
The equilibrium concept is a dynamic version of the coalitional equilibrium in Dotti (2015), that
is described in Dotti (2015). I assume rational expectations on and off equilibrium. This imples
that, given the history up to the the current period, the expectations are the same for all the
voters. I also assume that such expectations only depend on the state of the economy in that
period. Notice that, under this assumption, the state of the economy at the beginning of period
t + 1 is fully summarized by the share of elderly to young natives gt+1 = ot+1/nt+1, which is
therefore the unique endogenous state in the dynamic process. Denote with ht = {xs, gs}ts=0 the
full history of policy choices and states observed by all agents up to time t, with ht ∈ Ht. Denote
with x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt, ht−1) the expectation at time t about the equilibrium policy at time t+ s given
the state of the economy at time t and the history up to time t − 18, and with x∗t (gt, ϕt, ht−1)
the policy actually implemented at time t. I assume that:
x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt, ht−1) = x
∗∗
t+s(gt, ϕt, h
′
t−1)
for all histories ht−1, h′t−1 ∈ Ht−1 and all s ≥ 0. Moreover, the assumption of rational expec-
tations implies that x∗∗t+s(gt+s, ϕt+s, ht−1+s) = x
∗
t+s(gt+s, ϕt+s, ht−1+s) for all s ≥ 0. These two
assumptions imply that the dynamic system satisfies the Markov property. That is, there is no
equilibrium in which different histories correspond to different equilibrium choices given an iden-
tical economic environment is. I also assume that x∗∗t+s(gt+s, ϕt+s, ht−1+s) is twice differentiable
with respect to gt+s. This condition will prove to be satisfied in any Markov-Perfect coalitional
equilibrium under appropriate restrictions (see Lemma 6). Notice that expectations are assumed
to be a function of the state of the economy at time t, which is fully summarized by the state of
the economy gt. Also notice that gt+1 is perfectly known at the end of time t because there is
no uncertainty about the distribution of future productivity9. Given these assumption, I define
a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium as follows.
Definition 1. A Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium at time t is (i) a partition Pt of the
set of voters at time t, (ii) a policy profile At, (iii) a winning policy x
∗
t , and (iv) a set of
expectations about future policies {x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt, ht−1)}∞s=0 , such that (i) (Pt, At, x∗t ) is a coali-
tional equilibrium of the voting game given state gt and given expectations about current and fu-
ture policies {x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt, ht−1)}∞s=0 (ii) expectations are rational, i.e. x∗∗t+s(gt+s, ϕt+s, ht−1+s) =
x∗t+s(gt+s, ϕt+s, ht−1+s) for all i and for all s ≥ 0, and (iii) satisfy the Markov Property, i.e.
x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt, ht−1) = x
∗∗
t+s(gt, ϕt, h
′
t−1), for all s ≥ 0, all i and all ϕt ∈ Φt. For ease of notation,
8The value of x∗∗t is also a function of the distribution of productivity Q, but this is omitted in the formula.
9 The result is the same if one allows for uncertainty and the size of the population is very large, because the
law of large numbers implies that the identity of the median voter in the next period is known with probability
equal to 1.
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I am going to denote a coalitional equilibrium with (Pt, At, x∗t {x∗∗t+s}∞s=0; gt), in which I have
suppressed the arguments of x∗t and of each x
∗∗
t+s. Using this notion of equilibrium, I can state
the following Lemma:
Lemma 1. In a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium - if it exists - (i) each individual’s
ideal policy xit and (ii) the equilibrium policy x
∗
t at time t are invariant - conditional on gt
- to the history up to time t − 1, i.e. xit(gt, ϕt, ht−1) = xit(gt, ϕ, h′t−1) and x∗t (gt, ϕt, ht−1) =
x∗t (gt, ϕt, h
′
t−1) ∀t and ∀ht−1, h′t−1 ∈ Ht−1.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.1.
These results imply that the history up to time t − 1 is irrelevant for all aspects of the model
conditional on gt. This, from now on I am going to suppress the argument ht−1+s from the
formulas of x∗t+s, x
∗∗
t+s and x
i
t+s. Summarizing, gt is the unique endogenous state variable of
this dynamic system and a coalitional equilibrium in this model (if it exists) is a temporary
equilibrium that depends only on the value of the state variable gt at time t and is independent
of the previous history conditional on gt. Notice that gt is the ratio of elderly relative to native
individuals of working age, and therefore it represents the crucial variable in order to determine
the identity of the pivotal voter. Lemma 1 allows one to disregard the effects of current policy
choices (other than the effects on gt+1) on future equilibrium outcomes when calculating the
optimality conditions for each voter. This implies that future equilibrium policy outcomes affect
the individual objective functions at time t only through their effects on gt+1. The consequence
is that, given expectations x∗∗t+1(gt, ϕt), I can write a working age voter’s objective function
V it = V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) as follows:
V it = V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) = ν(xt, x
∗∗
t+1(gt, ϕt); θ
i
t, ϕt)
where x∗∗t+1(gt, ϕt) represents the expected equilibrium policies at time t+ 1 which are a function
solely of gt and ϕt. Similarly, one can define the corresponding objective functions of young
and old voters, V i,yt = V
y(Mt, Yt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) and V
i,o
t = V
o(Mt, Yt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) respectively. Notice
that these two objective function implies that an interior solution for the optimal policy of
individual i with a partially open immigration policy x2t = Mt > 0 may exist even if immigrants
“contribute less than what they take out” in the current period, or more precisely if - at a given
policy xt = (Mt,−Yt) - a marginal increase in the number of immigrants at constant Yt implies,
ceteris paribus, a rise in the income tax rate τt. This is true because if immigrants have higher
fertility rates in comparison with the natives (σmt > σ
n
t ), then a native individual of working
age will have a future benefit from immigration. Specifically, higher immigration today implies a
lower dependency ratio tomorrow and, as a consequence, a more generous state pension system.
This implies that this model is not affected by the dichotomy between “skilled migration” and
“unskilled migration” in the patterns of attitude towards immigration and income that is typical
of traditional models such as Facchini and Mayda (2008). In the model proposed in this paper
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the attitude towards immigration may improve with income even if the immigrants are a net
burden for the society in the short run, because preferences accounts for the future positive effect
of immigration. Moreover, these future benefits are increasing with income if the Bismarckian
component of the pension system is positive (γ > 0). Using the previously defined V it function I
can state the following result:
Lemma 2. The function V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) satisfies SM and SSCP in (xt; θ
i
t) for all θ
i
t ∈ Θt and
all ϕt ∈ Φt for any given state gt.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.2.
This Lemma is crucial in order to establish existence of a coalitional equilibrium, and therefore
to derive all the results in the next section of this paper. The intuition about how this result can
be proved relies on the effect of the Markov assumption. Recall that the expectations about the
policy outcome in any future period t + s are assumed to depend uniquely on the state of the
economy at the beginning of such period (gt+s), and that gt+s =
ot+s
nt+s
= lt+sMt+s(σmt+s−σnt+s)+σnt+s .
Thus, the only choice at time t that can affect the value of gt+1 - and therefore all future
expectations - is the one about the immigration policy Mt. As a consequence, conditional on Mt
and given parameters ϕt, the expectations about the policy implemented in the future periods
are unaffected by changes in Yt or θ
i
t. This makes the cross-partial derivatives of V with respect
to each policy dimension xk,t, xj,t, k 6= j and with respect to xk,t, θit for all k realtively easy to
calculate. Thus, the sufficient conditions for SM and SSCP - that are based on the sign of such
cross derivatives - can be shown to hold.
2.3.1 Conditions for a Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium
Following the static analysis in Dotti (2015), denote with ∧ and ∨ the meet and joint operators
over a lattice (see Dotti 2015). Recall that (i) θit ∈ Θt is the parameter that identifies the
preference of a voter i , that (ii) the parameter space Θt is a totally ordered set, and that (iii)
ϕt ∈ Φt is a vector of parameters that do not differ across voters. I state the conditions for a
Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium to exist and satisfy some desirable properties.
1. The policy space Xt must be a subset of the the d-dimensional real space R
d with typical
element xt, such that the partially ordered set (Xt,≤) is a convex and complete sublattice
of Rd.
2. Each individual i must be endowed with a reflexive, complete and transitive preference
ordering i represented by an objective function V : Xt × Θt × Φt → R that is jointly
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continuous in xt and θt − concave 10.
3. Individual preferences are such that the function V satisfies, given the state gt:
(a) Supermodularity (SM) in xt: V (x
′
t∨x′′t ; θt, ϕt, gt)−V (x′t; θt, ϕt, gt) ≥ V (x′′t ; θt, ϕt, gt)−
V (x′t ∧ x′′t ; θt, ϕt, gt) for all θt ∈ Θt , for all ϕt ∈ Φt and for all x′t, x′′t ∈ Xt.
(b) Strict Single Crossing Property (SSCP) in (xt, θt): V (x
′
t; θt, ϕt, gt)−V (x′′t ; θt, ϕt, gt) >
V (x′t; θt, ϕt, gt) − V (x′′t ; θt, ϕt, gt) for all x′t, x′′t ∈ Xt such that x′t ≥ x′′t and x′t 6= x′′t ,
for all ϕt ∈ Φt and for all θt, θt ∈ Θt such that θt > θt.
Regarding condition 1, I assume that Xt is the same in all periods. The assumptions on the policy
space stated in section 2.2.5 ensure that this condition is satisfied. Condition 2 simply requires
that the objective function satisfies some basic properties. Lastly, condition 3 is equivalent to
state that all voters can be ordered along a single preference dimension over a multidimensional
choice set. These assumptions on individual preferences are common in many fields of Economic
Theory. Notice that condition 3 is stated in a very general form, but in the case of a twice
differentiable objective function one can simply adopt the sufficient conditions in Milgrom and
Shannon (1994) in order to verify that the function satisfies SM and SSCP. Namely, one needs to
check that the following conditions hold. (i) ∂
2V
∂xi,t∂xj,t
≥ 0 ∀xt ∈ Xt, ∀i 6= j, and (ii) ∂2V∂xi,t∂θt > 0
∀xt ∈ Xt, ∀θt ∈ Θt, ∀i. These sufficient conditions are usually easier to verify in comparison
with the one implied by the definitions of SM and SSCP. Because of that, in the next sections I
am going to make frequent use of these sufficient conditions.
2.3.2 Monotone Comparative Statics
Denote the set of ideal policies of voter i in period t given state gt (and for a given expectations
{x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt)}∞s=0) with It(it) ≡ {xt|xt ∈ arg maxy∈Xt V (y; θit, ϕt, gt)},11, and define the set of
equilibrium policies as the union of all the policies that are winning policies in some coalitional
equilibrium of the game for given expectations {x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt)}∞s=0. Notice that because Θt is
a totally ordered set, one can identify a median element θvt . The individual characterized by
this value of the parameter is the median voter denoted by the index vt
12. In this setting,
conditional on gt and given expectations, the political process at time t is identical to the one
10For any function f defined on the convex subset Xt of Rd , we say that f is concave in direction v 6= 0 if,
for all x, the map from the scalar s to f(x + sv) is concave. (The domain of this map is taken to be the largest
interval such that x+ sv lies in Xt.) We say that f is i− concave if it is concave in direction v for any v > 0 with
vi = 0. See Quah (2007).
11Notice that the completeness of Xt implies compactness in the order-interval topology. On bounded sets in
Rd, the order-interval topology coincides with the Eucilidean topology (Birkhoff 1967). Hence It(it) 6= ∅ for all
i.
12In the case of a discrete even number of voters I assume that the ties are broken in favor of the individual
with the lower index. Different assumptions would not affect the results in the next paragraphs.
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of the static model described in Dotti (2015). Thus, the results stated in such paper hold in the
framework proposed here with minor modifications. Specifically, if the three conditions stated
in the previous section are satisfied, then the following theorems hold for any value of the state
gt.
Theorem 3. (Median Voter Theorem). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then (i) A Markov-
Perfect coalitional equilibrium of the voting game exists; (ii) in any equilibrium the set of winning
policies is a subset of the set of ideal points of the median voter vt; (iii) if the median voter has
a unique ideal policy, then the set of equilibrium policies is a singleton.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.
Theorem 4. (Monotone Comparative Statics). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then the set of
equilibrium policies of the voting game is (i) a sublattice of Xt which is (ii) monotonic nonde-
creasing in θvt .
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.
Lastly, consider a totally ordered subset Φ′ ⊆ Φ and suppose that the objective function
V (xt, θt, ϕt) satisfies the Single Crossing Property (SCP) in (xt, ϕt), namely V (x
′
t, θt, ϕt) −
V (x′′t , θt, ϕt) ≥ V (x′t, θt, ϕt) − V (x′′t , θt, ϕt) for all x′t ≥ x′′t , and for all ϕt, ϕt ∈ Φ′ such that
ϕt ≥ ϕt. Then I can state the following result:
Theorem 5. (Monotone Comparative Statics 2). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then the set
of equilibrium policies of the voting game is monotonic nondecreasing in ϕt.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.3.
The interpretation of this generalized Median Voter Theorem is identical to the one provided
for the static case described in Dotti (2015). Notice that, while It(vt) depends on voters’ ex-
pectations, the identity of the median voter vt is independent of expectations, thus the median
voter is the same in all colaitional equilibria of the voting game. The results in this sections
provide a tool to analyze the effects of a shock on the distribution of voters or on a preference
parameter on the policy outcome that emerges in a political equilibrium. One only has to verify
that an economic model satisfies the conditions stated in this section and then use Theorems 4-5
to formulate the predictions about the comparative statics of the platform that is implemented
in equilibrium. Following this approach, I derive the main results of this paper, which are stated
in the next section.
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3 Results
In this section I present the main results of the paper, namely the existence and charac-
terization of the voting equilibrium, the analytical comparative statics results, the dynamics of
the equilibrium outcome and the simulation of the other long-run implications of the model.
Notice that all the results described in this section - except for the cases in which the opposite
is explicitly stated - are also valid for the extended version of the model with endogenous public
education presented in section 4.3. The proofs in Appendix A include both the basic model and
the extended one (the objects that refer to the extended model are denoted with a tilda in the
proofs).
3.1 Equilibrium Existence and Characterization
Using the results in the previous sections we get that (i) the Policy Space (Xt,≤) is a convex
and complete sublattice of R2; (ii) the parameter set Θt is a totally ordered set; (iii) the objective
function V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) satisfies Supermodularity in xt and the Strict Single Crossing Property in
(xt; θ
i
t). Therefore all the conditions for the existence of a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium
are satisfied provided that V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) = ν(xt, x
∗∗
t+1(gt, ϕt); θ
i
t, ϕt) is such that x
∗∗
t+1(gt, ϕt) are
rational expectations and V is concave in x. Moreover, if the objective function of each working
age individual is strictly concave, then - given expectations - the ideal policy of the median voter is
unique. Notice that, because the indirect utility function ν is continuous, twice differentiable and
strictly concave in xt in each period t, and because of the assumptions on Q and on expectations
previously stated, there exists a threshold on σˆ such that if |σmt − σnt | ≤ σˆ, then V is also
continuous and strictly concave in xt. Thus, I can state the following result.
Lemma 6. If |σmt+s − σnt+s| ≤ σˆ for some σˆ > 0 and all s ≥ 0, then (i) a Markov-Perfect
coalitional equilibrium for the voting game exists. Moreover, (ii) in any Markov-Perfect coali-
tional equilibrium at time t the equilibrium policy is the unique ideal point of the median voter
xvt = x
∗
t ∈ It(vt). (iii) The parameter θvt that identifies the median voter is weakly decreasing in
gt. If σ
m
t − σnt is arbitrarily small, then (iv) there is a unique equilibrium policy that is chosen
in any Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium in period t.
Proof. See Appendix A.1.4.
Notice that the condition on σmt+s−σnt+s is sufficient but not necessary for results (i), (ii) and (iii)
in Lemma 6. In the rest of the paper, I am going to assume that ν and ϕt are such that continuity
and strict concavity are satisfied for any x∗∗t+1 that implies rational expectations
13. Notice that
Lemma 6 does not postulate the uniqueness of the Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium in
points (i), (ii), (iii). The reason is that, even if the equilibrium is unique conditional on gt and
13Notice that the requirement of joint continuity and concavity in xt are necessary for a coalitional equilibrium,
but not for the Citizen-Candidate version of the equilibrium in which individuals only run as single candidates.
Thus, one does not have to impose these two restrictions if such simpler model of electoral competition is adopted.
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on expectations {x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt)}∞s=0, there may be different rational expectations {x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt)}∞s=0
that may support different policies in equilibrium. Neverthless, the comparative statics results
in the next sections are valid in any equilibrium, thus the analysis is not affected by arbitrary
equilibrium selection rules14. Having established existence of an equilibrium and (conditional)
uniqueness of the policy outcome, I can use the result of the Monotone Comparative Statics of
the equilibrium outcome in order to study the effects of shocks on the voters’ distribution on the
equilibrium policy outcome.
3.2 Main Result: Comparative Statics
In this section I analyse the short-run effects of shocks on the parameters that are related to
population ageing on the equilibrium policy outcome. That is, how the equilibrium policy vector
changes as a consequence of a shock - in the period in which the shock is observed - relative to
the equilibrium level in absence of any shock. One has to account for four aspects: (i) how the
direct preferences over policies of each native individual of working age are affected by the shock
(“preference effect”), (ii) how the indirect preferences changes because of the effects of the shocks
on the governmental budget constraint (“budget effect”) and (iii) how the identity of the pivotal
voter changes as a consequence of the changes in the demographic composition of the population
induced by the shock (“political effect”). Lastly, one has to account for the ability of a fully
rational agent to anticipate that if σmt 6= σnt , then the choice of the immigration policy at time
t affects the demographic structure of the voting population in the following periods and can
therefore change the political equilibrium in the future. One may think that voters are unlikely
to really anticipate this (iv) “sophisticated effect”, therefore whenever this aspect is relevant in
this section I will distinguish between the predictions that emerge with “naive” agents - i.e. if
voters expectations do not account for future political effects of current policies - and the ones
implied by fully “sophisticated” agents. The approach used is the following. First I verify if
there is any effects of type (i), (ii) and (iv). In detail, if V it satisfies the condition of Theorem
5 for a given value of gt, then the theorem can be used to establish the sign of these effects.
Then I study the effects of type (iii). If gt is affected by the shock, then Lemma 6 (iii) implies a
change in the parameter that identifies the pivotal voter and therefore Theorem 4 can be used
to formulate the predictions. The results about the tax rate τt stated in this section refer to
the case in which immigrants provide, on average, a contribution to public finances sufficient to
ensure that τt is weakly decreasing in Mt. This is true whenever the average cost per pensioner
is sufficiently large, namely if lt−1p¯t−1 ≥ λt. The results about Mt and Yt are valid even if the
latter condition does not hold.
14The Markov assumption implies that each function x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt) is uniquely affected by gt and ϕt, thus the
comparative statics results are valid in any equilibrium of the game, provided that no changes in the functions
x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt) occur.
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3.2.1 Unanticipated Rise in the Longevity of the Retired Population
I analyse the effects of a marginal increase in lt−1 keeping other parameters constant. That
is, the longevity of the current elderly increases, keeping the longevity of other generations and
birth rates unchanged. Recall that xt = (Mt,−Yt). For effects of type (i)-(ii)-(iv) one can verify
that V it satisfies the SCP by studying the cross derivatives of V
i,y
t with respect to each policy
dimension and lt−1. Denote with V
i,y
Mt
(V i,yYt ) the partial derivative of V
i,y
t with respect to the
policy dimesion Mt (Yt) and with V
i,y
Mtlt−1 (V
i,y
Ytlt−1) the cross derivative of V
i,y
t with respect to
Mt (Yt) and a parameter lt−1. In this case we have:
V i,yMtlt−1 =
θit (α+ γ)
(1− M̂t)
≥ 0
V i,yYtlt−1 = 0
Consider a vector of parameters ϕ˜t ∈ Φt. Define a subset Φj,t ⊆ Φt as follows: Φj,t := {ϕt ∈
Φt|ϕt,k = ϕ˜t,k∀k 6= j}, where j is the position of the longevity of the elderly lt−1 at time t in
vector ϕt. Notice that Φj is a totally ordered set. Moreover, the signs of the cross derivatives
imply that V (xt; θ
v
t , ϕt, gt) satisfies SM and SCP in (xt;ϕt), it also satisfies SM and SSCP in
(zt;ϕt) where zt = (x1t,−x2t). The conditions of Theorem 5 are satisfied, therefore at constant
gt the effect is a weak rise in Mt and no changes in Yt. Moreover, V
i,y
Mt
is solely affected through
the budget constraint hence the effect is of type (ii) (“budget effect”). For effects of type (iii)
notice that gt =
lt−1
σ¯t−1
is increasing in lt−1. Lemma 6 (iii) implies that θvt is decreasing in gt.
Hence Theorem 4 implies a weak increase in the public spending variable Yt and a weakly more
restrictive immigration policy M t. The total effect of an increase in lt−1 is therefore weakly
positive on the public spending variables Yt and ambiguous on the immigration policy Mt.
There are cases in which one effects dominates and therefore the comparative statics result for
the immigration policy is also sharp. In particular, I can state the following results:
Theorem 7. The effect of an increase in the life expectancy lt−1 is weakly positive on the
spending policy and ambiguous on the immigration policy. Moreover, there exists a threshold
gˆt ∈ [0, 1] such that if gt ≥ gˆt then the effect on immigration policy is unambiguously (weakly)
negative and the effect on the tax rate is strictly positive.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.1.
In order to get an intuition of what drives this results, consider the following cases. If gt = 1
(i.e. there are as many working age individuals as elderly), then the pivotal voter has θvt = 0,
which implies that V v,yMtlt−1 = 0. Thus, there is no “budget effect” and the “political effect”
weakly dominates. On the other hand, consider the case in which the variance of the income
distribution is arbitrarily close to zero (e.g. yit = yt for all i). In this case, as long as gt 6= 1,
23
the θvt of the pivotal voter is unaffected by changes in the share of elderly, which implies that
the “political effect” is zero and that the “budget effect” weakly dominates. Theorem 7 is a
consequence of the negative relationship between age and attitude towards immigration and the
positive one between age and attitude towards public spending implied by the the model. This
result suggests the existence of a link between the size of the two effects and two characteristics
on the voting population: the share of elderly and the degree of income inequality. Moreover,
it implies that the sign of the effect of an increase in longevity on the equilibrium level of the
immigration quota is the one implied by the Tax Adjustment Model if the share of elderly is large
enough and there is sufficient income inequality, and the one implied by the Benefit Adjustment
Model in societies characterized by opposite features (see section 1.3).
3.2.2 Unanticipated Fall in the Natural Growth Rate of the Woking Age Population
The natural growth rate of the native population is ntnt−1+mt−1 − 1 = σ¯t−1− 1. In this model the
effect of an unanticipated fall in such rate has same sign as the one of a decrease in the lagged
birth rate of the natives σnt−1. This is true because one can show that σ¯t−1 = σ
m
t−1Mt−1+σ
n
t−1(1−
Mt−1), which implies that σ¯t−1 is predetermined at time t. This kind of shock corresponds for
instance to the case in which the birth rate actually experienced during the period t−1 is smaller
than the one expected at the beginning of that period. Therefore I analyse the effects of a shock
on σnt−1. I can state the following:
Theorem 8. The effect of a decrease in the growth rate of the working age population is a
weak decrease in the openness of the immigration policy and a weak increase in spending in the
imperfect Public Good and in the tax rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.2.
Notice that conditional on gt the shock has no effect on the equilibrium policy outcome (i.e.
there are no effects of type (i), (ii), (iv)). The reason is that the pension system adjusts its size
to changes in the birth rate for the reasons described in section 2. Nevertheless a fall in σnt−1
implies a rise in gt, which corresponds to a “political effect”. Using Theorem 4 one gets the
result stated above.
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3.2.3 Rise in Life Expectancy of the Working Age Population
I analyse the effects of a shock on the life expectancy of the current working age population lt,
keeping all the other elements of vector ϕt unchanged. First of all notice that gt is unaffected
by changes in lt, which means that there is no “political effect”. The results of this paragraph
are summarized in Theorem 9.
Theorem 9. The effect of an increase in the life expectancy lt is ambiguous on the immigration
policy. If voters are “naive” then the effect is weakly positive. If the birth rate of the native is
the same as the one of the immigrants, then there is no effect.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.3.
In order to understand this result it is useful to analyze the cross derivative of V i,yt with respect
to the immigration policy Mt and the parameter lt.
V i,yMtlt =
β(α+ γθit)
(1− M̂t+1)
(σmt − σnt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
preferences effect
− d
dlt
{
βl2t
σ¯t2
[
d′(Y ∗∗t+1)
dY ∗∗t+1
dθvt+1
− cˆ′(M∗∗t+1)dM
∗∗
t+1
dθvt+1
]
dθvt+1
dgt+1
(σmt − σnt )
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated effect
First of all, notice that if σmt = σ
n
t , then the cross derivatives are equal to zero and gt+1 is
unaffected by changes in lt, therefore a shock on lt has no effects on the equilibrium outcome.
If σmt ≥ σnt the sign of V i,yMtlt is ambiguous. The reason is that two different effects enter
the formula. On one hand a rise in the life expectancy makes consumption after retirement
more attractive. This increases the desirability of better future pensions and therefore implies
a more favorable attitude towards immigration (“preferences effect”). On the other hand more
immigration today reduces the value of gt+1. This changes the expected equilibrium policy in
the next period in a way that harms a retired individual (“sophisticated effect”). In particular,
a decrease in gt+1 causes a weak rise in M
∗∗
t+1 and a weak fall in Y
∗∗
t+1, because of the future
political effect. Which of the two effects dominates depends on many aspects, including the
income distribution at time t + 1 and the values of gt and gt+1. In particular notice that if the
variance of the income distribution of the working age population tends to zero, then
dθvt+1
dgt+1
= 0
and therefore the “preferences effect” dominates. Finally, if agents are “naive” then there is no
“sophisticated effect” and therefore an increase in lt has a weakly positive effect on the openness
of the immigration policy.
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3.2.4 Fall in the Birth Rate of the Native Population
I analyse the effects of a fall in σnt keeping all other parameters constant. The results are
summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 10. The effect of a decrease in the birth rate of the native population σnt is ambiguous
on the immigration policy and on the tax rate. If voters are “naive”, then the effect is weakly
positive on the immigration policy and weakly negative on the tax rate.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.4.
Similarly to the previous case, the presence of a “sophisticated effect” and of a “preferences
effect” that can have opposite sign implies that the sign of the comparative statics is ambiguous.
If voters are “naive”, then the preferences effect implies a weakly less restrictive immigration
policy Mt. Moreover, if the immigrants are net contributors to the fiscal system, this also
implies a weak fall in the tax rate τt. The intuition is that a fall in the birth rate of the natives
implies a stronger positive impact of immigration of future pensions and no fiscal effects in the
short run. Theorem 10 implies that a fall in the birth rate can have positive effects on public
finances and cause a fall in the tax rate because of an increasingly liberal immigration policy in
the short run. If this result may seem paradoxical, section 3.4 clarifies that this effect is true
only in the current period, while in the long run a fall in the birth rate may have strong negative
effects on public finances and tax rates.
3.2.5 Shocks on the Income Distribution of the Working Age Population
Given the state gt, a shock on the income distribution of the working age population affects the
equilibrium outcome if and only if it implies a change in the pivotal voter θvt . If this is the case,
it represents a shock of type (iii), if it is not, it has no effects. For instance, a shock that results
in a median preserving spread of the distribution of θt does not imply any change in the identity
of the median voter and therefore it does not affect the policy outcome. Thus, I can state the
following result.
Theorem 11. An increase in the median to mean income ratio implies in equilibrium (i) a weak
increase in the openness of the immigration policy Mt and (ii) a weak decrease in the public
spending in the imperfect Public Good Yt. Moreover, (iii) if the immigrants are net contributors
to the fiscal system then it also implies a weak fall in the tax rate τt.
Proof. Results (i), (ii), follows directly from Theorem 4. Result (iii) follows directly from the
governmental budget constraint and results (i), (ii). Q.E.D.
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Corollary 12. The equilibrium levels of Yt and Mt respond in opposite directions to shocks to
the voters’ distribution.
Proof. Straightforward from Theorem 11.
Notice that this result implies a positive correlation between the tightness of the immigration
policy and the spending in the imperfect public good. This suggests that the concerns about
the relationship between an open immigration policy and cuts to public benefits, which are
documented in all attitudinal studies, may have some ground in the observed policy outcomes
even if immigrants are net contributors to the tax system.
3.3 Steady-State Equilibrium
I define a long-run equilibrium of the overlapping generation model as a sequence of Markov-
Perfect coalitional equilibria from time t onwards. Within this class, I define a steady-state as
follows.
Definition 2. A steady-state at time t is a sequence of Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibria{
(Pt+s, At+s, x∗t+r, {x∗∗t+s+r}∞r=0; gt+s)
}∞
s=0
such that, in each time t+s, and in absence of shocks
on the parameters ϕt+s, (i) the policy platform implemented in equilibrium is the same in each
period t + s, i.e. x∗t+s = x
∗∗
t+s = x
ss for all s ≥ 0, and (ii) the state of the economy is constant
gt+s = g
ss for all s ≥ 0.
In the definition above, the superscript ss denote the steady-state value of a state or a control
variable. In other words, in a steady state the equilibrium policy and the natural growth rate of
the population are constant over time. Recall that g is the only state that evolves endogenously
in the dynamic system and that at a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium in each period t+ s
- conditional on gt+s and on expectations {x∗∗t+s+r}∞r=0 - the equilibrium policy x∗t may not be
unique. Neverthless, if the conditions of Lemma 6 are satisfied, then the set of equilibrium
policies is a singleton, and in order to show that the economy is at a steady state one has to
show that gs = g
ss for all s > t. Conditional uniqueness also implies that if gt+s = gt+s+1 in
period t+ s and if the parameters are such that (lt+s, σ
m
t+s, σ
m
t+s) = (l, σ
m, σm) for all s > 1, i.e.
ϕt+s = ϕ for all s > 1, then gt+s = gt = g
ss for all s > t. In such case, if gt+1 = gt+2, then the
economy is at a steady state.
Lemma 13. If there exists a Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium in each period t + s, for
all s ≥ 0, then (i) an equilibrium for the OLG model at time t exists . Moreover, if ϕt+s = ϕ
for all s > 0, then (ii) there is an equilibrium that always converges to a steady-state. Lastly, if
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σmt = σ
n
t = σt, then (iii) the political equilibrium at time t is independent of the previous political
choices and the economy converges immediately to the steady state after a shock.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.5.
Notice that this statement does not necessarily imply that the steady state is unique, except for
case (iii).
3.4 Dynamics
The analysis of the dynamics of the OLG model is a complex exercise because of the number
of different short-run effects described in the previous sections. There are anyways interesting
results that can be stated about the long-run effects of shocks in this framework. In particular,
I present two analytical results: (i) the long-run effects of an unanticipated permanent shock
on the longevity of the elderly lt−1 and/or on the natural growth rate of the native population
σ¯t−1 on the sequence of political equilibria from the period after the shock until the economy
converges to a new steady state (keeping other parameters constant); (ii) the long-run effects of
an unanticipated permanent shock in the life expectancy (lt) and/or on the expected birth rate
of the native population (σnt ) in the case in which immigration does not cause changes in the
age profile of the society (i.e. σmt − σnt ≤ η for arbitrarily small η). For the other cases which I
cannot address analytically I propose a simulation in section 3.5 which show that the results are
not qualitatively different from the one presented in the following paragraphs.
3.4.1 Long-Run Effects of a Permanent Shock on the Longevity of the Retired
Population and on the Natural Growth Rate of the Working Age Population
The sign of the long-run effects of a positive shock on the longevity lt−1 or on the natural growth
rate of working age population σ¯t−1 − 1 at time t depend on the ambiguous short-run effects
on the immigration policy stated in Theorems 7-8. In order to address the effects at period
t+ 1 and the following ones it is sufficient to notice that, given that the shock is permanent (i.e.
lt+s = lt or σ
n
t+s = σ
n
t for all s ≥ 0), the collective choice problem at time t+ 1 is identical to the
one at time t except for the value of g. Thus, there is an equilibrium in which expectations are
time-independent. In such equilibrium, all the changes in the policy choices at time t + 1 must
be due to the evolution of the endogenous state gt+1. The results in Lemmas 7b-8b apply to this
class of equilibrium. In particular notice that gt+1 is strictly decreasing in Mt, and therefore if
Mt ≥Mt−1 (Mt ≤Mt−1) then gt+1 ≤ gt (gt+1 ≥ gt). Lemma 6 (iii) ensures that the parameter
that identifies the pivotal voter changes accordingly θvt+1 ≥ θvt (θvt+1 ≤ θvt ). Therefore I can state
the following results.
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Theorem 7b. The long-run effect of an increase in lt−1 on the immigration policy has same sign
as the short-run effect and a weakly larger magnitude. If gt ≥ gˆt then the effect on immigration
policy is (weakly) negative and the effect on the public spending and the tax rate is strictly positive.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.5.
Similarly one can analyse the long-run effects of a fall in the natural growth rate of the native
population of working age (or equivalently of σnt−1, see section 3.2.2). The result is the following.
Theorem 8b. The long-run effect of a decrease in the natural growth rate of the native population
is a weak decrease in the openness of the immigration policy and a weak increase in spending
in the imperfect Public Good and in the tax rate. All the effects have weakly larger magnitude
relative to the short-run effects.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.5.
These results imply that the effects of population ageing are persistent and tend to increase
in magnitude in the periods after the shock. The reason is that - if immigrants have higher
fertility rate relative to the natives - then a change in the size of the immigration flow affects
the distribution of voters in the following periods. In particular, a more restrictive immigration
policy in the current period implies further population ageing in the future and therefore an
increase in magnitude of the initial effects.
3.4.2 Long-Run Effects of a Permanent Rise in Life Expectancy
I analyse the long run effects of changes in lt. This shock generates a number of effects that
affect the temporary equilibrium as described in the previous sections. Moreover, the specific
path of policies depends on the timing of the different shocks (for instance shocks on lt and lt−1
may occur simultaneously). I study the case in which σmt is arbitrarily close to σ
n
t and the shock
is permanent, i.e. lt+s is equal to the new value of lt for all s > t. This case is simple to analyze
because the long run effects at time t and t + 1 after the shock correspond, respectively, to the
temporary effects of a rise in lt and lt−1 described in the previous sections. Moreover, given that
σmt+s − σnt+s is arbitrarily small, then the “preference effect” and the “sophisticated effect” can
be disregarded and the economy converges to the new steady state one period after the shock15.
Under the proposed restrictions I can state a sharper result:
15Notice that under such restriction, the Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium is unique in every period (see
Lemma 6), hence - in contrast with the previous paragraph - there is no need to select a class of equilibria.
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Theorem 14. The long-run effects of an increase in the life expectancy is a weak rise in public
spending and, if gt ≥ gˆt, a weak decrease in the openness of the immigration policy.
Proof. In the case of σmt − σnt ≤ η the sign of the long-run effect corresponds to the short-run
effect of an increase in lt−1. Q.E.D.
3.4.3 Long-Run Effects of a Permanent Fall in the Birth Rate of the Natives
I study the long-run effects of a marginal fall in σnt , in the case in which σ
m
t − σnt is arbitrarily
small and the shock is permanent, i.e. the rise of σnt implies that σ
n
t+s will be equal to the new
value of σnt for all s > t.
Theorem 15. The long-run effects of a marginal decrease in the birth rate of the native popu-
lation is a weak rise in public spending. The effect on the openness of the immigration policy is
ambiguous at time t and weakly negative in the following periods. If voters are “naive” the effect
on the openness of the immigration policy is weakly positive at time t and weakly negative in the
following periods.
Proof. In the case of σmt − σnt ≤ η the long-run effect corresponds to the short-run effect of an
decrease in σt followed by a decrease in σt−1. Q.E.D.
The results in this section suggest that if immigrants are not too different from the natives in
terms of fertility rates, then the long run effects of population ageing follow the patterns of the
corresponding short-run effects.
3.5 Simulation
Some interesting cases cannot be fully described analytically, in particular the long-run effects of
permanent shocks on the parameters in the case in which the birth rate of immigrant is different
from the one of the natives. In order to study these cases I run a simulation of the model whose
results are extensively presented in the supplementary material of this paper. This exercise shows
that the effects due to the sophistication of voters may be substantial in terms of levels of the
equilibrium policy, but they do not generally imply qualitatively different predictions about the
shape of the curves describing the policy response to shocks on the parameters. I find that for
several different parametrizations - if the difference in the birth rate of immigrants and natives
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(σmt −σnt ) is not too large16 - then the predictions of Theorems 14 and 15 are valid even if voters
are “sophisticated” (Figures 9-10-11-12) . Figures 13 and 14 show the response of the immigration
policy Mt and of the spending policy Yt to a permanent rise in the life expectancy of the retired
population, both for the case of “naive” voters (dashed lines) and of sophisticated voters (solid
lines). Although the shape of the two lines is very similar, the equilibrium level is different.
Sophisticated individuals fully internalize the effect of current immigration on the composition
of the society in the following period. In particular, they anticipate that more immigration
in the current period would imply a higher share of young individuals in the next period, and
therefore an equilibrium policy that is less favorable to them when they will be retired. Therefore
the equilibrium with “sophisticated” voters features a more restrictive immigration policy and a
higher public spending in comparison with the case of “naive” voters.
The simulation exercise can also help to understand the factors that determine the speed of
convergence to the steady state after a shock. The crucial aspect is that the speed is decreasing
in the size of the “sophisticated effect”, specifically in the value of σmt − σnt . Figures 15-16
show the path of convergence of the immigration policy Mt after a positive (solid line) and a
negative (dashed line) shock on the endogenous state gt, in the case of high difference (Fig. 15,
σmt − σnt = 1) and low difference (Fig. 16, σmt − σnt = 0.2) in the birth rates of immigrants and
natives. This exercise suggests that the key results in the previous sections still apply even to the
cases in which the long run effects of shocks in the model cannot be characterized analytically.
Thus, I can conclude that - in a society characterized by a very large share of retired individuals
- population ageing leads to a policy that is closer to the needs of the elderly. In particular, high
public spending and increasingly restrictive immigration policies are going to be implemented.
These policy changes imply an increasing tax burden on the individuals of working age and may
affect the fiscal sustainability of public spending in the long run.
4 Extensions
In this section I propose three extensions in which I introduce alternative forms of public inter-
vention in social spending and a different legal status of the immigrants. I describe if and how
the equilibrium political choices differ from the one presented in section 3. Specifically, I analyse
the implication of the model if (i) the pension system is partially funded, if (ii) immigrants do
not acquire voting rights and if (iii) the government provides public education. On one hand the
main comparative statics results of this paper remain generally valid. On the other hand these
exercises deliver some understanding of how different rules in the public sector may affect the
attitude towards immigration of the voting population. Lastly, in section 4.4, I describe (iv) an
extension of the model in which the labour market is segmented. In particular, I study the case
16For large value of σmt − σnt the steady-state may not be unique and a shock may cause a transition to a
different equilibrium path. Moreover, the conditions in Lemma 6 may not be satisfied.
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in which the elderly demand specific services, such as home care, and only immigrants possess
the skills to provide such services. In this case the results may differ substantially from the ones
of the baseline model.
4.1 Partially Funded Pension System
The assumption of a pure Pay-As-You-Go pension system is a very stylized description of how
the social security for the elderly is organized in most developed countries. In particular partially
funded pension schemes are becoming increasingly common. There is empirical evidence of an
increasing size of the funded part of the pension relative to the “state pension” in European
countries (Galasso and Profeta, 2004). The theoretical analysis proposed by Rangel and Zeck-
hauser (2001) suggests that this phenomenon may also be related to the increase in the number
of elderly relative to the working age population. In the model proposed in this paper I did not
explicitly account for savings. One simple possibility is to model the funded part of the pension
system as a form of compulsory savings. Under this assumption each individual has to save an
amount ψ(ρ)s(yit) when young and she will receive (1 + r)ψ(α + γ)s(y
i
t) when retired, where r
is the exogenous interest rate and ψ is a strictly decreasing function. The total pension received
by i at time t+ 1 becomes:
pit =
(
α+ γ
yit
y¯t
)
σ¯t
(1− M̂t+1)
+ (1 + r)ψ(α+ γ)s(yit)
This formulation implies that if the state-pension component falls (e.g. if γ decreases) then the
funded pension part rises. Notice that - because the utility function is linear in consumption -
the size of the compulsory saving does not affect voter preferences over policies. Thus, the effect
of a marginal transition towards a fully funded pension system simply corresponds to the effect
of a fall in the Beveridgean part of the state pension α or of a fall in the Bismarckian part γ (or
both). Hence I can state the following result:
Theorem 16. The effect of a marginal decrease in the size of the public pension system in
the short run is an increase in the restrictiveness of the immigration policy. In the long run,
the effect is an increase in restrictions to immigration and an increase in public spending in the
imperfect Public Good. The total effect on the tax rate is ambiguous.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The intuition that underpins this result is simple. If the share of the Pay-As-You-Go component
of the pension system decreases in favor of a fully funded scheme, then the fiscal gains from
immigration for a worker decrease because the total size of public pension expenditures to be
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shared among the working age population is smaller. Moreover, the future gains from immigra-
tion also decrease, because public finance aspects have a lower impact on the overall pension
enjoyed by a retired individual. Therefore all voters become more averse to immigration and ask
for a more restrictive policy. In the long run, if the immigrants have higher fertility rates relative
to the natives, this political choice causes an increase in the share of elderly individuals, with
consequences that are similar to the ones described in section 3.4.1 for the case of increasing
life expectancy. Namely, a further tightening in the immigration policy and an increase in the
endogenous part of public spending prevail in equilibrium. An important aspect of this analysis
is that if the size of the state pension system becomes too small (e.g. small α+ γ) then the total
gains from immigration for a working age individuals may become negative, which implies an
equilibrium in which the most restrictive immigration policy is implemented.
4.2 Voting Rights: Ius Soli vs. Ius Sanguinis
In the previous sections I have assumed that the children of immigrants that are born in the
guesting country are awarded the voting right when they become adults (Ius Soli). Moreover,
in the model voting rights can be also acquired after a sufficiently long period of legal residency.
These assumptions are consistent with the legal procedures to obtain citizenship - and conse-
quently voting rights - in several countries such as the US, Canada and France. In many other
countries - such as the UK, Japan, Germany and Italy - the legal requirements are often quite
different and they do not typically imply an automatic award of the citizenship based of the
place of birth only. The most common case is that at least one of the parents must possess the
citizenship in order for the children to obtain the same status (Ius Sanguinis). It is out of the
scope of this paper to formulate assumptions that precisely describe the law of different coun-
tries. Nevertheless, in order to understand the possible effects of different legal requirements, it
is useful to analyze the consequences of the opposite assumption in comparison with the one in
section 3.2 of this paper. Namely, in this section I assume a pure form of Ius Sanguinis, in which
neither the immigrants nor their children ever obtain the nationality. This assumption is clearly
extreme and only serves as a term of comparison.
The main implications of the model stated in Theorems 7-8 are unaffected by this modifi-
cation, except that for one aspect. Specifically, immigrants and their children do not become
members of the voting population at any point in time. Therefore the choice of the immigration
policy does not affect the future composition of the voting population. This implies that there is
no “sophisticated effect” in this case, and therefore some of the results in section 4 are sharper.
Namely for any σnt , σ
m
t such that σ
m
t ≥ σnt one gets:
Theorem 17. (i) the short-run effect of a rise in lt in unambiguously (weakly) positive on the
immigration policy Mt and weakly negative on the tax rate τt; the long-run effects of (ii) an
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increase in the life expectancy and of (iii) a decrease in the birth rate of the native population is
a weak rise in public spending and, if gt ≥ gˆ, a weak increase in the openness of the immigration
policy at time t followed by a weak fall in the following periods.
Proof. The relevant variable for determining the pivotal voter is in this case g˜t =
lt−1n˜t−1
n˜t
= lt−1σnt−1
where n˜t−1 ≤ nt−1 is the number of young individuals that possess voting rights at time t − 1
and it is smaller or equal to the number of individuals that are born in the country. Notice that
g˜t is independent of Mt−1. The rest of the analysis is unaffected. All the proofs are identical to
the ones for Theorems 9-10 except that no “sophisticated effect” occurs.
Theorem 17 suggests that the analytical predictions of the model are not strongly affected
by the cross-country differences in the law that regulates the acquisition of the citizenship, and
that - on the contrary - some results tend to become sharper and less sensitive to changes in
parameter values if an extreme version of the Ius Sanguinis is assumed.
4.3 Endogenous Public Education
I analyse an extension of the model in which the income of an individual depends not only on the
wage rate and on her productivity, but also on the amount of education she received when she
was a child. I assume that education is uniformly provided by the government and has decreasing
returns given by the strictly concave function f . Individual fertility of natives is given in this
alternative setting by the random variable kit, that is i.i.d. and with E[k
i
t] = σ
n
t . I get that the
income of an individual i at time t can be written as follows:
yit = f(et−1)wt
i
t
and the total supply of effective labour at time t becomes Lt = f(et−1)¯t(nt +mt). The budget
constraint accounts for the public spending in education, such that the formula for the tax rate
on labour income becomes:
τt = τ(et,Mt, Yt, y¯t) = y¯t
−1
[
σ¯tet + λtMt + (α+ γ)lt−1
(1−Mt)
(1− M̂t)
+ Yt
]
Moreover, I assume that working age individuals (retired individuals) care about the utility of
their children (grandchildren) such that the utility function of an individual of generation a can
be written as follows:
U˜ i,at = U
i,a
t
({
Cis,Ms, Ys
}t+1
s=t
)
+ δaE
[
kitU
j,y
t
({
Cjs ,Ms, Ys
}t+2
s=t+1
)]
Lastly, I assume that the number of voters is large, such that the uncertainty about the size
of the future generation does not affect the result. Notice that given the assumptions about kit
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the preferences shown above can also represent individuals that care about the next generation
rather than about their children and grandchildren. The structure of the overlapping generations
model in the same as in the baseline model, except for the presence of an additional endogenous
state et−1 which affects the average income at time t. A coalitional equilibrium exists under the
assumptions stated in Lemma 6 and most results of this augmented model about the comparative
statics of shock on life expectancy are the same as the ones described in the previous section. (See
Appendix A.2). The interesting aspect of this analysis is the counterintuitive effect of population
ageing on public investment in education (per child). Such effects are stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 18. The effects of an increase in the longevity of the retired population lt−1 and /or of
a decrease in the growth rate of native population σnt−1 is a weak increase in the public spending
in education per child et.
Proof. See Appendix B.1.
The intuition that underpins this result is that if an elderly individual cares about her grand-
children (i.e. δo > 0), then she will always support any policy that increases the spending in
education through a rise in the taxes on the working age population, because she is not affected
by this rise in the tax rate. The consequence of Theorem 18 is that the next generation may
enjoy a better education and a higher pre-tax income as a consequence of population ageing.
Notice that the overall welfare effect of the policy adjustment is not necessarily positive for these
individuals. The negative side for future generations may come from the results in Theorems 7
and 8, which hold also in the augmented model (see Appendix A). In particular, in period t a
more restrictive immigration policy is implemented. Thus, the future generations may have to
face an society with a larger share of elderly which implies, ceteris paribus, higher tax rates on
labour income and more public spending. Such policy can be harmful for the most productive
individuals of the next generation. The second result is the following.
Theorem 19. If voters are “naive” and
ltp
v
t+1
et
≥ θvtβ , then the effects of a decrease in the birth
rate of the native population σnt is a weak fall in the public spending in education per child et and
a weak increase in the openness of the immigration policy. Else both effect have an ambiguous
sign.
Proof. See Appendix A.2.4.
Theorem 19 suggests that the cost of public education may play a role in shaping the effects
shocks on fertility rates on the immigration policy. On one hand immigration tends to reduce the
pressure of the pensions system on public finances, on the other hand it causes an increase in the
total costs of public education. If the latter effect is sufficiently strong, the predictions are going
to be different from the one implied by the baseline model. This is particularly relevant if one
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considers that several countries are implementing reforms in order to reduce the Pay-As-You-Go
share of the pensions received by the elderly in favor of a fully funded system (see section 4.1).
Nevertheless, the public expenditures for the elderly represents a large share of the governmental
budget in most western countries and, more importantly, they consistently exceed the ones in
education and childcare (OECD 2015, 2015b). Notice that the assumption
ltp
v
t+1
et
≥ θvtβ is satisfied
if β is close to 1 and the median cost of a pensioner is weakly larger than the cost of educating a
child. Thus, OECD data suggest that such assumption is consistent with the facts about public
spending in most OECD countries.
4.4 Services for the Elderly (“Elderly Goods”)
In this section I present the results of an extension of the model in which the labour market is
segmented. In particular, I study the case in which immigrants possess the skills to provide those
services that are needed only by the elderly, such as home care, while the natives workers do
not. This may be the case if immigrants are selected by the firms in the receiving country on the
basis of their qualifications and previous work experience. In the next line I describe informally
the characteristics that differentiate this setting from the baseline model. A detailed description
of the economic environment is provided in Appendix B.2. Suppose that the elderly consume a
different private good denoted by Ot. This good is produced with the same technology as the
consumption good Ct and the imperfect public good Yt, but only the immigrant workers are
capable of producing it. Immigrants can also be employed in the production of the other goods.
For simplicity I assume that there is no difference in the average tax payments of immigrants
and natives, i.e. λt = 0, that the default immigration is M̂t = 0 and I analyse the case in which
σmt − σnt is arbitrarily small. There are two possibilities. If at the equilibrium there are enough
immigrant workers to satisfy the demand for “elderly goods” at a sufficiently low price, then
the segmentation of the labour market is irrelevant and the results are identical to the baseline
model. The perfect substitutability in production and the perfect competition ensure that all
prices are are unaffected by immigration choices. The implications change dramatically if in the
proximity of an equilibrium there are not enough immigrant workers to satisfy the demand for
the “elderly good” at the constant price17. I can state the following result.
Theorem 20. If gt ≤ 1 then at the equilibrium, if it exists, the immigration policy is Mt = 0,
else a positive level of immigration is possible.
Proof. Appendix B.2.
This result implies that, as long as the majority of voters is of working age, the society always
chooses the most restrictive immigration policy. Moreover, a shock on the longevity or the fertility
17Notice that multiplicity of equilibria is possible in this case.
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of the native population does not affect the immigration policy in equilibrium. The channel that
underpins this result is the effect of immigration on equilibrium prices. Specifically, immigrants
are endogenously hired in the sector that produces the “elderly good” Ot, but they consume
only the other two goods Ct and Yt. As a result, immigration in equilibrium implies a rise in the
relative prices faced by the young natives, offsetting the fiscal benefits generated by immigrants
and making working age voters extremely hostile to immigration. The conclusion one can derive
from this section is that some implications of the analysis presented in section 3 of this paper
are true for this extended case only if in the proximity of the equilibrium the immigration policy
is not too restrictive. If the number of immigrants is too low to satisfy the demand of services
for the elderly, then some predictions in section 3 of the paper are no longer valid. The result
in this case is somewhat paradoxical: a society that is in great need of immigrants to satisfy the
demand of services for the elderly tend to be very averse to any positive level of immigration of
specialized workers. Additional details and results about this extension of the model are available
in the supplementary online material.
5 Welfare Analysis
In the previous section I have proved that a rise in the longevity or a fall in the birth rate
of the native population generates a political pressure towards more restrictive immigration
policy. This does not necessarily imply that this change is desirable on the point of view of the
society as a whole. In this section I present a welfare analysis which shows that, if a society
has certain demographic characteristics, a marginal increase in the restrictions to immigration
is unambiguously harmful for the society. I define a measure of the wellbeing of the society in
the form of a Social Welfare Function (SWF ). The idea that is exploited in this section is the
following. If at an equilibrium policy the marginal effect of an increase in a policy dimension
xj,t on the SWF is greater than than the one of the median voter (and at the equilibrium
x∗j,t < x¯j,t), then there exists a policy with x
′
j,t > x
∗
j,t which is welfare improving. This implies in
turn that if, as a consequence of a shock, a certain policy dimension j is such that x∗j,t−1 > x
∗
j,t,
then xj,t has moved in the “wrong direction” on a social welfare point of view and that the
society would benefit, ceteris paribus, from a marginal change in the direction of x∗j,t−1. In other
words, the society is harmed by the change in policy at the margin. Consider a SWF that is
a weighted average of the utility of each individuals of the working age generation (y), of the
retired generation (o) at time t and the expected future utility of the children (ch), where µat (θ
i
s)
represents the Pareto weight assigned to an individual i of generation a at time t. Notice that I
am not ruling out either the possibility that the SWF attributes zero weight to the immigrants
or the possibility that some or all the immigrants have positive weight18. The SWF has form:
SWF (xt, ;ϕt, gt) =
θ¯tˆ
0
µyt (θ
i
t)V
y(xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt)q(θ
i
t)dθ
i
t+
18One has to specify the objective function of an immigrant in this case.
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+θ¯t−1ˆ
0
µot (θ
i
t−1)V
o(xt; θ
i
t−1, ϕt, gt)q(θ
i
t−1)dθ
i
t−1+
θ¯t+1ˆ
0
µyt+1(θ
i
t+1)Et
[
V y(x∗∗t+1; θ
i
t+1, ϕt+1, gt+1)
]
q(θit+1)dθ
i
t+1
Most welfare implications of this analysis depend on the Pareto weights assigned to each indi-
vidual in the SWF. For instance, some results that can be obtained using a specific SWF (e.g.
Utilitarian or Rawlsian) are presented in the supplementary material. Nevertheless an interesting
general result can be stated under relative weak restrictions on the SWF. Specifically, I analyse
the welfare effects of changes in the immigration policy keeping the other policy dimension con-
stant at the equilibrium level. This analysis is also consistent with the extended model presented
in section 4.3.
5.1 Welfare Effects of a Marginal Opening in the Immigration Policy
Assume that c′(Mt) < ∞ for all xt ∈ Xt and that at the equilibrium 0 < Mt < M t, i.e. the
solution is internal for the immigration policy. Then I can state the following result.
Theorem 21. For any Social Welfare Function SWF (xt;ϕt, gt) that assigns a strictly positive
weight to each native individual of working age, there exist a threshold gˇt ∈ [0, 1] such that if
gt ≥ gˇt then a marginal tightening in the immigration policy caused by a change in the equilibrium
outcome reduces the Social Welfare.
Proof. See Appendix B.3.
The intuition that underpins this result is that - as gt tends to 1 - the parameter θ
v
t that identifies
the pivotal voter get close to 0. On one hand, the benefits for the individuals of working age
from a marginal opening of the immigration policy increase rapidly as Mt approaches 0. On the
other hand, the cost of immigration becomes increasingly small at low levels of Mt. If θ
v
t = 0,
then Mt = 0, which implies that the marginal social gains from immigration are very large
relative to the marginal social costs. Also notice that the converse of the statement in Theorem
21 is not always true. Specifically, a threshold g˘t ∈ [0, 1] such that if gt ≤ g˘t then the society
would benefit from a marginally more restrictive immigration policy may not exists for all the
SWF s with the features stated above. Nevertheless, such threshold g˘t exists for Utilitarian and
Rawlasian SWF. The result in Theorem 21 suggests that societies characterized by high income
inequality and/or by a high share of elderly on the total population (which have a gt close to 1 or
larger) are likely to adopt excessively restrictive immigration policies. Moreover, it implies that
a tightening in the immigration law - for instance the one caused by population ageing - reduces
the Social Welfare. In other words, the policy adjustment of the immigration quota is harmful
for the society. This result is suggestive in the light of the increasingly and rather controversial
restrictions to immigrations that have been progressively introduced in countries characterized
by a rapidly ageing population and by a high degree of income inequality, such as the UK and the
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USA, or in countries that feature by a very large elderly population, such as Japan or Italy. In the
supplementary material I propose a welfare analysis about the effects of a change in the public
spending in the imperfect Public Good and in education. These results are less general because
they rely on more restrictive assumptions about the SWF (e.g. Utilitarianism). Nevertheless,
they suggest that the allocation of public spending may be too generous for the imperfect Public
Good and perhaps insufficient for education in society characterized by high income inequality
and by a large share of elderly.
6 Empirical Evidence
In this section I investigate the determinants of the attitudes towards immigration and public
spending of adult residents in Great Britain using data from the British Social Attitude Survey,
and in particular from the rounds of data 2009 - 2011 - 2013 that includes a specific section about
immigration. The dataset accounts for a total of 6639 observations. The explanatory variables
are the age of the respondent, the income decile of the household and the highest educational
qualification attained by the respondent, on a scale from 1 (postgraduate degree) to 8 (no qual-
ification). Observations of individuals with foreign qualifications have been omitted. Dummy
variables capture whether the household includes children, and if the respondent is a woman, if
she lives in rural areas, if she is born abroad and if she is not part of any religion. Characteristics
related to the employment status and type are captured by dummies. In particular, I include
the effects of being employed in a manual job, unemployed or retired.
6.1 Determinants of Attitude towards Immigration
The outcome variable LETIN captures the attitude towards further immigration in the coun-
try. The question is “Do you think the number of immigrants to Britain nowadays should be
increased a lot, increased a little, remain the same as it is, reduced a little or reduced a lot?” and
the respondents must choose a value on a discrete scale from 1 (“increased a lot”) to 5 (“reduced
a lot”). The variable LETIN measures therefore the degree of aversion towards further immigra-
tion. I use an ordered Logit model because of the discrete and ordered nature of the outcome
variable. Table 1 presents the results of this analysis. In line with what observed in the litera-
ture and with what is implied by the model proposed in this paper, the age of the respondent
exhibit a significant positive relationship with the hostility towards immigration. Moreover, the
parameter on household income is negative and significant in all the specifications. This means
that high income individuals tend to be less averse to immigration relative to the low income,
and this is consistent with the implications of model. Similarly, low level of education tend to
be associated with a stronger aversion to immigrants. Lastly, the presence of children in the
household, the location in a urban area and the birth of the respondent outside of the UK are
all significantly related to a more positive attitude towards immigrants.
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Table 1. Determinants of Attitudes Towards Immigration
6.2 Determinants of Attitude towards Public Spending
The outcome variable TaxSpend is a measure of the attitude towards public spending financed
through taxation. This variable capture a fundamental trade-off that drives the results in section
3. Namely, it measures the degree of aversion to higher taxes in exchange of more social spending.
The question is “Suppose the government had to choose between the three options on this card:
reduce taxes and spend less on health, education and social benefits, Keep taxes and spending
on these services at the same level as now, Increase taxes and spend more on health, education
and social benefits. Which do you think it should choose?” and the respondents must choose a
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value on a discrete scale from 1 (“spend less”) to 3 (“spend more”). I use an ordered Logit model
for the same reasons explained in the previous section. Table 2 shows the results of this analysis.
The relationship between the outcome variable and the age and the income of the respondent
are both significant and the signs are consistent with the implication of the model.
Table 2. Determinants of Attitude towards Public Spending
In line with with the previous literature, unemployment is also related with a more favorable
attitude towards public spending. It is somewhat surprising that low levels of education are
associated with a stronger aversion to taxes and public spending. This may be due to factors that
are not considered in the theoretical analysis and that are likely to vary across different education
level, such as knowledge of the structure of the fiscal system, awareness of the demographic and
economic structure of the country and degree of altruism.
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6.3 Discussion
The analysis in this section provides a strong support for two crucial implications of the model
regarding voters’ preferences in Britain. Namely, the analysis of the attitudinal data in the BSA
suggests that older age tend to be associated with stronger aversion towards immigration and with
a higher propensity to increase the size of public intervention in public spending policies, even if
this implies higher taxes. Moreover, the analysis implies that (conditional and unconditional on
the level of education), higher levels of income tends to corresponds to a more positive attitude
towards immigrants and to a stronger propensity to cut taxes and public spending. It may be
worth to underline that this analysis does not make any claim about a causal relationship between
the variables of interest. The results in section 6.1 are consistent with other similar studies in
the literature that use alternative dataset and analyse other countries or group of countries. For
instance Dustmann and Preston (2007), Facchini and Mayda (2007) and Card et al. (2011),
using respectively data from the British Social Attitude Survey, the International Social Survey
Programme and the European Social Survey, all support these findings. Thus, one can conclude
that there is substantial empirical evidence in support of the patterns of attitudes induced by age
and income that are implied by the model proposed in this paper, even if no causal relationship
can be claimed. A more general question concern the empirical support to the main predictions
of the paper, which concern the comparative statics of the policy outcome. Specifically, it would
be critical for this stream of literature to assess in future research if population ageing tend to
be associated to more restrictive immigration policies and, if so, to what extent this is due to a
causal link between these two variables. The answer to this question is not strightforward. First
of all, population ageing is a demographic phenomenon that produces effects on a very long time
span and it is likely to be associated to a number of other economic and political transformations.
Thus, it is not an easy task to disentangle its effect on specific policies, such as immigration, from
other endogenous processes that may induce correlation between the the variables of interest.
Moreover, immigration policies are not easy to measure. The “tightness” of an immigration
policy is a multidimensional concept, in the sense that such policies can be restricted in various
ways, targeting different kinds of immigrants, etc. Moreover, its relationship with the number
of immigrants that legally enter a country in a given period of time may be highly endogenous.
For instance, on one hand it is reasonable to expect that a country with a more restrictive
immigration policy allows, ceteris paribus. a smaller number of immigrants to enter the country
relative to one with a more liberal set of rules. On the other hand, a country that is subject
to a more intense immigration pressure, for instance because it is more attractive for potential
immigrants, may tend to experience a larger inflow of immigrants even if its immigration policy
is more restrictive in comparison with a less attractive country. Similarly, an increase in the
immigration pressure due to exogenous factors may translate into a more restrictive immigration
law and to a larger inflow of foreigners in the country. In other words, immigration choices
and policy choices are two interdependent endogenous processes, and this must be accounted
for if one aims to study the latter in isolation from the former. Lastly, immigration policies are
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often formulated in terms of qualitative requirements, which may not be easy to translate into
an objective measure of “tightness”. For instance, the immigration law often assign different
status to potential immigrants that possess different education levels, or that come from specific
countries. Attempts to measure the “tightness” of immigration policies have been made by Boeri
and Brucker (2005) for 15 European countries countries and by Ortega and Peri (2009) for 14
OECD countries. Their measures consist of a number of indexes constructed under different
definitions of “tightness” of an immigration policy. The limitations in the use of these data are
not neglegible. Specifically, the low number of observations, the limited extent of time variation
that can be exploited and the robustness of the findings to different concepts of “tightness”
are important issues. Thus, this literature did not provide so far enough evidence in support
or against the predictions of the model proposed in this paper. This remains an open and
challenging question for future research.
7 Concluding Remarks
This paper investigates the interaction between two crucial demographic, economic and social
processes in our society: ageing and immigration. The aim is to analyse how these two pro-
cesses shape policy choices in democratic countries, and how such policy choices may affect the
demographic profile of the society. In particular, I study the effects on immigration policies of
two major demographic changes that have caused population ageing in western societies, namely
increasing life expectancy and decreasing birth rates. The main finding concerns the fiscal con-
sequences of population ageing. That is, if the share of elderly population is large enough,
population ageing increases the political pressure to restrict the inflow of immigrant workers into
the country and to rise public spending. This result implies that the negative effects of population
ageing on public finances - due to increasing costs for public pensions - may be exacerbated by
the endogenous political effects on immigration and public spending policies. Direct and indirect
effects of the ageing phenomenon may affect the overall fiscal soundness of the public sector in
the long run. The second result looks at the demographic consequences of ageing. In particular,
I show that the effects of a demographic shock on the age profile of the population tend to worsen
with time because of the endogenous political effects on the immigration policies. Specifically, I
find that an ageing society tends to support increasingly restrictive immigration policies. This
translates into a reduced number of immigrants and - in some cases - into further population
ageing in the future. The third finding is about social welfare. I show that the changes in the
immigration policy induced by population ageing tend to harm the society, in particular the
young individuals and future generations. One element that emerges from this analysis is that
the way in which costs and benefits generated by immigration are divided up in the society is
crucial to determine the attitudes towards immigration of different demographic groups. This
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implies that an analysis of the political processes that lead to the division of these net gains is
essential in order to assess the political effects of ageing on immigration policies. Thus, the study
of the latter cannot abstract from how fiscal policies are determined.
There are anyway some limitations in this analysis that one has to consider. First, in this
study the endogenous adjustment of wages has no effect on the equilibrium policy choices. This is
due to the assumption that the individual labour supply is perfectly inelastic both at the extensive
and at the intensive margin. This modelling choice is justified by theoretical (Ben-Gad, 2004) and
empirical considerations (Dustmann and Preston, 2006, 2007; Boeri, 2010) and can be relaxed to
some extent (see additional material). Nevertheless this aspect is likely to play a role in shaping
immigration policies. Thus, this is a topic that calls for further research. Secondly, I do not
fully investigate the effects of the heterogeneity in the productivity of immigrants. This aspect is
likely to be relevant given that such heterogeneity may be - at least to some extent - endogenous
in the political process. For instance, simple theoretical models suggest that countries with a
generous welfare system may attract relatively low skilled immigrants (Borjas, 1999), and that
the attitude towards different types of immigration may vary with the composition of skills of the
native population (Benhabib, 1996). Even if the empirical literature provide limited support for
two these channels (see Preston, 2014), they represents important elements to enrich the study
of the determinants of immigration policy. Lastly, a deeper analysis of the determinants of the
aversion to immigration due to concerns related to the effects on the “compositional amenities”
of the society is needed in order to better understand what other factors shape immigration
policies. This aspect has been shown to play a major role in attitudinal studies (Card et al.,
2011) and it is an active field of research in other disciplines (see Brettell and Hollifield, 2007), but
it has not been sufficiently analyzed with the tools of economic theory. A more general remark
should be made about the model of political interaction and the equilibrium concept adopted in
this paper. This framework represents a tool that does not only serves for the purposes of this
analysis, but it is sufficiently general to be used in many other applications in Political Economy.
In a companion paper (Dotti, 2015) I show how this theoretical framework can be useful to
analyze problems of redistribution in the spirit of Meltzer and Richard (1981) and to reconcile
the controversial predictions about the relationship between income inequality and size of the
government - that are typical of that literature - with the empirical evidence. In this paper, I
show that such framework can be extended to study simple dynamic problems in an OLG model.
There are many other questions in Political Economy for which the multidimensionality of the
policy space represents a major obstacle in the analysis, and that therefore represent a promising
field of application for the voting model presented in this paper. Examples of these potential
new applications are described in Dotti (2015).
Lastly, I emphasize that this analysis delivers an essentially pessimistic message about the
evolution of our society in the immediate future and its consequences for the young generations.
If population ageing means an increasing power for the elderly to shape public policies according
to their needs, the main victims of this process are going to be the young, both the ones born
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in rich countries and the ones native of poorer regions. On one hand the former will have to
support the fiscal burden of an increasingly large and long-living elderly population through high
tax rates on their income. On the other hand the latter are going to be prevented from searching
for better employment opportunities by the excessively restrictive immigration policies that are
going to be implemented in the high income countries.
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Appendix
A Proofs: Main Results
Appendix A includes the proofs to the main results of the paper. Specifically, in appendix A.1
I prove the Lemmas related to the existence of a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium. In
appendix A.2 I provide proofs of the main comparative statics results.
A.1 Existence of Equilibrium
A.1.1 Markov Property of Ideal Policies
Lemma 1. In a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium - if it exists - (i) each individual’s
ideal policy xit and (ii) the equilibrium policy x
∗
t at time t are invariant - conditional on gt -
to the history up to time t − 1, i.e. xit(gt, ϕt, ht−1) = xit(gt, ϕt, h′t−1) and x∗t (gt, ϕt, ht−1) =
x∗t (gt, ϕt, h
′
t−1) ∀t and ∀ht−1, h′t−1 ∈ Ht−1.
Proof. Part (ii) is simply a consequence of rational beliefs and of the Markov property. Part (i)
follows the F.O.C.s for each individual i at time t:
V˜ i,yMt = −c′(Mt) + θit (α+ γ)
lt−1
(1− M̂t)
− θitλt +
(
βlt
(1− M̂t+1)
(α/θit + γ)− et
)
(σmt − σnt )θit+
+βlt
3∑
j=1
∂V i,ot+1
∂xj
dx∗∗j,t+1
dMt
V˜ i,yYt = −θi + b′(Yt) + βlt
3∑
j=1
∂V i,ot+1
∂xj
dx∗∗j,t+1
dYt
V˜ i,yet = −E(σt)θit + δσnt f ′(et)E(ω¯t+1) + βlt
3∑
j=1
∂V i,ot+1
∂xj
dx∗∗j,t+1
det
as x∗∗t+1 only depends upon gt+1 =
lt
σ¯t(Mt)
, (and in the case of endogenous education, the pivotal
voter is unaffected by et) then the above reduces to:
V˜ i,yMt = −c′(Mt) + θit (α+ γ)
lt−1
(1− M̂t)
− θitλt +
(
βlt
(1− M̂t+1)
(α/θit + γ)− et
)
(σmt − σnt )θit+
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+βlt
3∑
j=1
∂V i,ot+1
∂xj
dx∗∗j,t+1
dgt+1
lt(σ
m
t − σnt )
σ¯2t
V˜ i,yYt = −θi + b′(Yt)
V˜ i,yet = −E(σt)θit + δσnt f ′(et)E(ω¯t+1)
Given that the F.O.C.s are invariant to hs for all s < t and that the optimum is unique, then
the individual ideal policy must be invariant to hs for all s < t as well. Q.E.D.
A.1.2 SM and SSCP
Lemma 2. The function V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) satisfies SM and SSCP in (xt; θ
i
t) for all θ
i
t ∈ Θ and
for all ϕt ∈ Φt for any given state gt.
Proof. Given the definition of V it (V˜
i
t for the full model):
V it = V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) =
{
V i,y if young then θ = θit
κV o if old then θ = −1
With x1t = Mt, x2t = −Yt, x3t = −et and for an arbitrarily large κ > 0. Notice that κ represents
a strictly increasing transformation of the original objective function of the elderly therefore κV o
implies the same preferences as V o. First I need to show that each component V i,yt , V
o
t (V˜
i,y
t ,
V˜ ot ) satisfies the required properties and then I will show that it also holds for the overall function
V it (V˜
i
t ). Recall the objective function of a young individual in the baseline model is:
V i,yt = (1− τt)ωit + b(Yt)− c(Mt) + βlt
(
(α+ γθi,yt )σ¯t
(1− M̂t+1)
+ d(Y ∗∗t+1)− c(M∗∗t+1)
)
and in the full model is:
V˜ i,yt = (1− τt)f(et−1)ωit + b(Yt)− c(Mt)+
βlt
(
(α+ γθi,yt )
σ¯t
(1− M̂t+1)
+ d(Y ∗∗t+1)− c(M∗∗t+1)
)
+ δyσnt f(et)ω¯t+1
Below I derive the conditions for the full model with endogenous education. Given these con-
ditions, the ones for the baseline model are straightforward. Given that the function V˜ i,yt is
twice differentiable under the assumption stated in section 2.3, sufficient conditions for SM and
SSCP are simply related to the sign of the cross derivatives and in particular: V˜ i,yetMt , V˜
i,y
etYt
≤ 0,
V˜ i,yMtYt ≥ 0 for all x ∈ X and all θti ∈ Θ and V˜
i,y
etθit
, V˜ i,y
Ytθit
< 0, V˜ i,y
Mtθit
> 0 for all x ∈ X and all
θti ∈ Θ. The first derivatives are:
V˜ i,yMt = −c′(Mt) + θit (α+ γ)
lt−1
(1− M̂t)
− θitλt +
(
βlt(α/θ
i
t + γ)
(1− M̂t+1)
(α/θit + γ)− et
)
(σmt − σnt )θit+
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+βlt
(
d′(Y ∗∗t+1)
∂Y ∗∗t+1
∂Mt
− c′(M∗∗t+1)
∂M∗∗t+1
∂Mt
)
V˜ i,yYt = −θi + b′(Yt)
V˜ i,yet = −σ¯tθit + δσnt f ′(et)ω¯t+1
Notice that the expectations M∗∗t+1 and Y
∗∗
t+1 are solely affected by Mt (through gt+1) because of
the Markov assumption. Calculate the cross derivatives of V˜ i,yt with respect to each two policy
dimensions:
V˜ i,yetMt = −θit(σmt − σnt ) ≤ 0
V˜ i,yetYt = V
i,y
YtMt
= 0
And with respect to each policy dimension and the parameter θit (recall that x
∗∗
t is a function of
solely gt+1 and it is therefore invariant to θ
i
t):
V˜ i,y
etθit
= −E(σt) < 0
V˜ i,yMtθit
=
(α+ γ) lt−1
(1− M̂t)
− λt −
(
et − βltγ
(1− M̂t+1)
)
(σmt − σnt ) > 0
V˜ i,yYtθit
= −1 < 0
Notice that the FOCs with respect to Mt imply that an interior solution with a partially open
migration policy Mt > 0 can exist even if immigrants “contribute less than what they take out”
in the current period, or more precisely if at a given policy (et, Yt,Mt) a marginal increase in the
number of migrants at constant et, Yt implies a rise in the income tax rate. This is true because a
native individual of working age will have a future benefit from immigration
βlt(σ
m
t −σnt )
(1−M̂t+1)
(α+γθit)
which incorporates the fact that he will partially internalize the positive effect of immigration
today on the governmental budget constraint in the following period through the adjustment
in the pension system. This implies that this model is not affected by the dichotomy between
“skilled migration” and “unskilled migration” in the patterns of attitude towards immigration
and income that is typical of traditional models such as Facchini and Mayda (2008). In my
model the attitude towards immigration may improve with income even if the immigrants are a
net burden for the society in the short run, because if the Bismarkian component of the pension
system is positive (γ > 0), then the future benefits of current immigration are increasing with
income. The next step is to state the elderly’s objective function and calculate its first derivatives.
Using the formulas for Cot+1 we get:
V˜ o = lt−1 [d(Yt)− c(Mt)] + δoE(kit)f(et)ω¯t+1
First derivatives are:
V˜ oet = E(k
i
t)f
′(et)E(ωt+1) > 0
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V˜ oMt = −lt−1c′(Mt) < 0
V˜ oYt = lt−1d
′(Yt) > 0
Cross derivatives:
V˜ oetMt = V˜
o
etYt = V˜
o
YtMt = 0
Notice that the preferences for (Mt, Yt, et) are the same for all elderly individuals. Now I can
show that the function V˜ (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) satisfies (i) SM and (ii) SSCP in (xt; θ
i
t).
(i) SM. It follows from SM of V˜ i,yt and V˜
o
t . (ii) SSCP. I need to show that if x
′
t ≥ x′′t , x′t 6= x′′t
and θ′t > θ
′′
t then
V˜ (x′t; θ
′′
t , ϕt, gt)− V˜ (x′′t ; θ′′t , ϕt, gt) > V˜ (x′t, ; θ′t, ϕt, gt)− V˜ (x′′t ; θ′t, ϕt, gt)
(ii) (a) θ′t, θ
′′
t 6= −1. SSCP follows from SSCP of V i,yt and V ot . (ii) (b)θ′ 6= −1, θ′′t = −1. Notice
that V˜ (x′t; θ
′′
t , ϕt, gt)−V˜ (x′′t ; θ′′t , ϕt, gt) > 0 is always true under the assumption previously stated
so it is sufficient to choose κ large enough such that SSCP holds trivially. (ii) (c) θ′t, θ
′′
t = −1.
Straightforward. Also notice that under the restriction the parameter set
Θt :=
{
θit|θit =
{
θi,yt if age = y
−1 if age = o
}}
is a totally ordered set. Q.E.D.
A.1.3 Median Voter Theorem and Comparative Statics
Theorem 3. (Median Voter Theorem). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then (i) A Markov-
Perfect coalitional equilibrium of the voting game exists; (ii) in any equilibrium the set of winning
policies is a subset of the set of ideal points of the median voter vt; (iii) if the median voter has
a unique ideal policy, then the set of equilibrium policies is a singleton.
Proof. Consider an objective function ν(xt, x
∗∗
t+1(gt, ϕt); θ
i
t, ϕt) for some (common) expectations
x∗∗t+1(gt, ϕt). Notice that notion of coalitional equilibrium implies that rational expectations
must exists at time t, because the political process implied by such equilibrium concept always
delivers a policy outcome (it can be an equilibrium outcome in the form of a Condorcet winner,
or, in case such outcome does not exist, a default policy x0). Thus, rational expectations exist
even if there is no Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium at time t + 1. Moreover, given that
in each period t + s voters’ indirect utility ν - conditional on gt+s and xt+1+s is unaffected by
history up to time t − 1 + s, then there must be rational expectations x∗∗t+1(gt, ϕt) that satisfy
MP. Thus, choose a function x∗∗t+1 such that the expectations are rational and satisfy the MP.
These two ensure that conditions (ii) and (iii) of the definition of Markov-Perfect coalitional
equilibrium (Definition 1) are satisfied. The Markov assumption (MP) implies x∗∗t+1(gt, ϕt) =
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x∗∗t+1(gt+1(xt, ϕt), ϕt+1). Using such rational expectations, define the function V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) =
ν(xt, x
∗∗
t+1(gt+1(xt, ϕt), ϕ); θ
i
t, ϕt). This is the objective function that corresponds to the static
case of coalitional equilibrium. Theorem 1 in Dotti (2015) states that, if condition 1-2-3 are
satisfied, then a coalitional equilibrium exists in the form (Pt, At, x∗t ) (see Ch.1, Theorem 1).
This implies that condition (i) of Definition 1 is also satisfied. Then a Markov-Perfect coalitional
equilibrium exists. Results (ii) and (iii) in Theorem 3 follow directly from Theorem 1 in Dotti
(2015) (see Dotti, 2015). Q.E.D.
Theorem 4. (Monotone Comparative Statics). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then the set of
equilibrium policies of the voting game is (i) a sublattice of Xt which is (ii) monotonic nonde-
creasing in θvt .
Proof. Theorem 3 implies that if conditions 1-2-3 are satified, then (Pt, At, x∗t {x∗∗t+s}∞s=0; gt) is
a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium and (Pt, At, x∗t ) is a coalitional equilibrium given the
objective function V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕ) = ν(xt, x
∗∗
t+1(gt+1(xt, ϕt), ϕ); θ
i
t, ϕt), in which x
∗∗
t+1 satisfy Rational
Expectations and MP. Thus, the results in Theorem 2, in Dotti (2015) apply. Q.E.D.
Theorem 5. (Monotone Comparative Statics 2). If conditions 1-2-3 are satisfied, then the set
of equilibrium policies of the voting game is monotonic nondecreasing in ϕ.
Proof. Theorem 3 implies that if conditions 1-2-3 are satified, then (Pt, At, x∗t {x∗∗t+s}∞s=0; gt)
is a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium and (Pt, At, x∗t ) is a coalitional equilibrium given
the objective function V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) = ν(xt, x
∗∗
t+1(gt+1(xt, ϕ), ϕ); θ
i
t, ϕt), in which x
∗∗
t+1 satisfy
Rational Expectations and MP. Thus, the results in Theorem 3, in Dotti (2015) apply. Q.E.D..
A.1.4 Equilibrium Existence and Characterization
Lemma 6. If |σmt+s − σnt+s| ≤ σˆ for some σˆ > 0 and all s ≥ 0, then (i) a Markov-Perfect
coalitional equilibrium for the voting game exists. Moreover, (ii) in any Markov-Perfect coali-
tional equilibrium at time t the equilibrium policy is the unique ideal point of the median voter
xvt = x
∗
t ∈ It(v). (iii) The parameter θvt that identifies the median voter is weakly decreasing in
gt. If σ
m
t − σnt is arbitrarily small, then (iv) there is a unique equilibrium policy that is chosen
in any Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium in period t.
Proof. (i) Consider expectations {x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt)}∞s=0 that are consistent with a MCE such
that x∗∗t+s(gt+s, ϕt+s) is unique and differentiable, and
∣∣∣dx∗∗k,t+sdxj,t+s ∣∣∣ ≤ ct+s(k, j) for all k, j and
all s ≥ 0, in which ct+s(k, j) are numbers that are arbitrarily close to 0. I need to show
that such expectations are rational for σˆ close enough to zero. Start with x∗∗t (gt, ϕt). As
stated, x∗∗t+1(gt, ϕt) satisfies the Markov property, hence x
∗∗
t+1(gt+1(xt, ϕt), ϕt+1) = x
∗∗
t+1(gt, ϕt).
Moreover, it is differentiable and consistent with a unique MCE. This means x∗∗t+1(gt+1, ϕt+1) =
x∗t+1(gt+1, ϕt+1) = x
v
t+1(gt+1, ϕt+1), i.e. must be the unique ideal point of the median voter
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vt+1. Thus
dx∗∗k,t+1
dxj,t
=
∂x∗∗k,t+1
∂gt+1
∂gt+1
∂xjt
=
∂x∗∗k,t+1
∂θvt+1
∂θvt+1
∂xj,t
. Notice that
∂θvt+1
∂xj,t
= 0 for all j except for
the one such that xj,t = Mt. In such case,
∂θvt+1
∂Mt
= − lt(σmt −σnt )[(σmt −σnt )Mt+σnt ]2
1
q(θvt+1)
, which is finite
for all Mt and tends to 0 as σ
m
t − σnt → 0 (notice that if vt+1 is the median voter, then
q(θvt+1) > 0, and continuity of q implies that his must be true in a neighborhood of θ
v
t+1).
Moreover,
∂x∗∗k,t+1
∂θvt+1
= 0 if k is in a corner solution of the maximization problem of the median
voter, else
∂x∗∗k,t+1
∂θvt+1
= −Vxk,t+1θt+1+
∑
j 6=k Vxk,t+1xj,t+1Vxj,t+1θvt+1
Vxk,t+1xk,t+1
. The numerator is finite (see A.1.2).
About the denominator, it is finite if
dx∗∗k,t+2
dxj,t
is finite for all k, j. But this is true because
expectations are such that
∣∣∣dx∗∗k,t+2dxj,t+1 ∣∣∣ ≤ ct+2(k, j) for all k, j. One gets dx∗∗k,t+1dxj,t is the product of
a finite factor times a factor that is continuous in σmt − σnt and tends to zero as σmt − σnt → 0.
Hence, there exists σˆ > 0 such that if |σmt − σnt | ≤ σˆ, then
∣∣∣dx∗∗k,t+1dxj,t ∣∣∣ ≤ ct+1(k, j) for all k, j.
Because ct+1(k, j) are arbitrarily close to zero, this implies that V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) is strictly concave,
thus x∗t (gt, ϕt) is consistent with a MCE, unique and differentiable and
dx∗k,t
dxj,t
≤ ct(k, j) for all
k, j. As rational expectations are assumed, then x∗∗t (gt, ϕ) must also satisfy those properties.
Similarly, one can show that x∗∗t+1 is consistent with MCE, unique, differentiable and satisfies
dx∗∗k,t+1
dxj,t+1
≤ ct+1(k, j) for all k, j given such expectations. Thus, recursively, one can show that this
is true for all x∗∗t+s(gt+s(xt+s−1, ϕt+s−1), ϕt+s) with s ≥ 0 and, because of the Markov assumption,
for x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt) for all s ≥ 0. This means that V (xt+s, θit+s, ϕt+s, gt+s) is continuous and strictly
concave in xt+s (it satisfies SM and SSCP because of Lemma 2) and that the expectations
{x∗∗t+s(gt, ϕt)}∞s=0 are rational and satisfy the Markov property. Summarizing, (i) Lemma 2 and
the definitions of the policy space Xt and of the parameter space Θt, plus the result above imply
that all the conditions for the existence of a coalitional equilibrium in Theorem 1 are satisfied. (ii)
The strict concavity of the objective function of each working age individual and the convexity
of X imply that the pivotal voter has a unique ideal policy, and therefore that is the only policy
vector that can be implemented in any coalitional equilibrium of the voting game. (iii) If gt ≤ 1,
then the median individual in the totally ordered set Θt solves Q(θ
v
t )nt + lt−1(mt−1 + nt−1) =
[1−Q(θvt )]nt19. Rearranging and solving for θvt one gets θvt = Q−1
(
1−gt
2
)
which is weakly
positive and weakly decreasing in gt. If gt > 1, then the parameter of the pivotal voter is fixed
at θit = −1. Lastly, for (iv), if σmt → σnt then dx
∗∗
k,t+1
dxj,t
→ 0 for any rational expectations. Thus
V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) is strictly concave in xt and in period t there is a unique policy vector x
∗
t that is
chosen in any MCE given gt. Given that gt is known at time t, then x
∗
t must be unique. Q.E.D.
19The tie-breaking rule assumed in section 2.1.2 ensures that this formula is correct even if the number of voters
is even.
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A.2 Comparative statics
A.2.1 Unanticipated rise in the longevity of the retired population
Theorem 7. The effects of an increase in the life expectancy lt−1 is weakly positive on the
spending policy and ambiguous on the immigration policy. Moreover, there exists a threshold
gˆ ∈ [0, 1] such that if gt ≥ gˆ then the effect on immigration policy is unambiguously (weakly)
negative and the effect on the tax rate is strictly positive.
Proof. Calculate the cross derivatives of V i,yt (V˜
i,y
t ) with respect to each policy dimension
Mt, Yt, et and the parameter lt−1.
V˜ i,yMtlt−1 =
θvt (α+ γ)
(1−M∗t )
> 0
V˜ i,yYtlt−1 = 0
V˜ i,yetlt−1 = 0
(i) Effects at fixed gt. Consider a totally ordered subset Φ
j
t := {ϕt ∈ Φt|ϕi,t = ϕˆi,t∀i 6= j}
where j is the position of the longevity parameter in the vector ϕt, i.e. ϕj,t = lt−1. Notice that
V˜ (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) in Φ
j
t satisfies SM in (xt) and SSCP in (xt;ϕt), it also satisfies SM in (zt) and
SSCP in (zt;ϕt) for zt = (x1t,−x2t,−x3t). Using Theorem 3, one gets 4Mt ≥ 0, 4Yt = 0,
4et = 0, 4τt ≤ 0. (ii) Recall that
gt =
lt−1
σ¯t−1
which is increasing in lt−1. Hence a rise in lt−1 corresponds to a change in the voter distribution
such that the new median voter is lower than before. Hence 4Mt ≤ 0, 4Yt ≥ 0, 4et ≥ 0,
4τt ≥ 0. Total effect: ambiguous for Mt. But 4et ≥ 0, 4Yt ≥ 0. Finally notice that if gt = 1
then θvt = 0 and V˜
i,y
Mtlt−1 = 0, which means that the “budget effect” is equal to zero and therefore
the the political effect (weakly) dominates. Hence there exists a threshold gˆ ∈ [0, 1] (possibly
gˆ = 1) such that if gt ≥ gˆ then the effect on immigration policy is unambiguously (weakly)
negative. Q.E.D.
A.2.2 Unanticipated fall in the natural growth rate of the native population
Theorem 8. The effects of a decrease in the growth rate of the working age population is a weak
decrease in the openness of the immigration policy and and a weak increase in spending in the
imperfect Public Good and in the tax rate.
Proof. Calculate the cross derivatives of V i,yt (V˜
i,y
t ) with respect to each policy dimension
Mt, Yt, et and the parameter σ
n
t−1.
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V˜ v,yetσnt−1
= V˜ v,yYtσnt−1
= V˜ v,yMtσnt−1
= 0
Recall that, but the share of “old” voters decreases at each point in time:
gt =
lt−1
σ¯t−1
which is decreasing in σnt−1. Using Theorem 3, a fall in σ
n
t−1 implies4Mt ≤ 0, 4Yt ≥ 0, 4et ≥ 0,
4τt ≥ 0. Q.E.D.
A.2.3 Rise in the life expectancy of the working age population
Theorem 9. The effects of an increase in the life expectancy lt is ambiguous on the immigration
policy. If voters are “naive” then the effect is weakly positive. If the birth rate of the native is
the same as the one of the immigrants, then there is no effect.
Proof. One needs to analyze the cross derivative of V˜ i,yt with respect to Mt, Yt, et and the
parameter lt. Define p˜i
i,o
t+1 = (α + γθ
i
t)
σ¯t
1−M̂t+1
+ d(Yt+1)− c(Mt+1) (this is only relevant for the
case of endogenous public education).
V˜ i,yMtlt =
β(α+ γθit)
(1− M̂t+1)
(σmt − σnt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
preferences effect
− β2lt
σ¯t2
 3∑
j=1
dp˜ii,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
∂x∗∗j,t+1
∂θvt+1
 dθvt+1
dgt+1
(σmt − σnt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated effect
− βl
2
t
σ¯t2
 3∑
j=1
d2V˜ i,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
∂x∗∗j,t+1
∂θvt+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
dlt
+
dp˜ii,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
d
dlt
(
∂x2∗∗t+1
∂θvt+1
) dθvt+1
dgt+1
(σmt − σnt )︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated effect
V˜ i,yYtlt = 0
V˜ i,yetlt = 0
First of all notice that if σmt = σ
n
t , then the cross derivatives are equal to zero and gt+1 is
unaffected by changes in lt, therefore a shock on lt has no effects on the equilibrium outcome.
53
If σmt ≥ σnt the sign of V˜ i,yMtlt is ambiguous. The reason is that two different effects enter the
formula. On one hand an increase in life expectancy increase the relative weight of consumption
after retirement in the utility function of a working age individual, increasing the desirability
of better future pensions and therefore of an increase in the number of immigrants at time t
(“preferences effect”). On the other hand there is a “sophisticated effect” that concerns the
effect of current political choices on future outcomes. If the “preferences” effect dominates, then
using the same procedure as in C.5.1 I can show that V˜ (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) satisfies SM in (xt) and
SSCP in (xt;ϕt) in Φ
j
t where ϕj,t = lt, it also satisfies SM in (zt) and SSCP in (zt;ϕt), for
zt = (x1t,−x2t,−x3t), which by Theorem 3 implies 4Mt ≥ 0,4τt ≤ 0 and no effect on the other
variables. If the “sophisticated” effect dominates in a similar way one can show that 4Mt ≤ 0,
4τt ≥ 0. If agents are “naive” then there is no “sophisticated effect” because dθ
v
t+1
dgt+1
= 0 and
therefore an increase in lt has a weakly positive effect on the openness of the immigration policy.
Q.E.D.
A.2.4 Decrease in the birth rate of the natives
Theorem 10. The effects of a decrease in the birth rate of the native population σnt is a weak
increase in the openness of the immigration policy and a fall in the tax rate. The effects of a
decrease in the birth rate of the native population σnt is ambiguous on the immigration policy. If
voters are “naive”, then the effect is weakly positive.
Proof. Calculate the cross derivatives of V i,yt (V˜
i,y
t ) with respect to each policy dimension
Mt, Yt, et and the parameter σ
n
t . v˜
i,o
t+1 is defined as in A.2.3.
V˜ vMtσnt = etθ
v
t︸︷︷︸
b.e.
− βlt(α+ γθ
v
t )
(1− M̂t+1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
preferences effect
+
+
βlt
σ¯t2
[
d′(Y ∗∗t+1)
∂Y ∗∗t+1
∂θvt+1
− cˆ′(M∗∗t+1)
∂M∗∗t+1
∂θvt+1
]
dθvt+1
dgt+1
[
1 +
2(1−Mt)(σmt − σnt )
σ¯t
]
+︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated effect
+
βlt(σ
m
t − σnt )
σ¯t2

 3∑
j=1
d2p˜ii,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
(
∂x∗∗j,t+1
∂θvt+1
)2 dx∗∗j,t+1
dσt
+
dp˜ii,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
∂x2∗∗t+1
∂(θvt+1)
2
(dθvt+1
dgt+1
)2
+
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated effect
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+ 3∑
j=1
dp˜ii,ot+1
dx∗∗j,t+1
∂x∗∗j,t+1
∂θvt+1
 d2θvt+1
d(gt+1)2
︸ ︷︷ ︸
sophisticated effect
Notice that in this case the effect of σnt on future outcomes affect the pivotal voter. Also
notice that d′(Y ∗∗t+1)
∂Y ∗∗t+1
∂θvt+1
− cˆ′(M∗∗t+1)∂M
∗∗
t+1
∂θvt+1
≤ 0 because Theorem 11. Hence for σmt = σnt the
sophisticated effect is weakly positive hence the overall effect is ambiguous. If agents are naive
then
dθvt+1
dgt+1
= 0 and the overall sign is negative if and only if:
ltp
v
t+1
et
≥ θ
v
t
β
i.e. the total transfer in pensions to the median voter at time t + 1 is sufficiently large in
comparison with his tax expenditure in education per pupil (notice that this is always true in
the basic model with no public education).
V˜ vYtσt = 0
V˜ vetσnt = −θvt (1−Mt) + δf ′(et)ω¯t+1 > 0
as long as et > 0 at the equilibrium (this condition is only relevant for the extended model).
V˜ (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) satisfies SM in (z
′
t) and SSCP in (z
′
t;ϕt) in Φ
j (ϕj,t = σ
n
t ), where z
′
t = (−x1t,−x2t,−x3t),
it also satisfies SM in (z′′t ) and SSCP in (z
′′
t ;ϕt) where z
′′
t = (−x1t,−x2t, x3t). By Theorem 3 a
fall in σnt implies: 4Mt ≥ 0, 4Yt = 0, 4et ≤ 0, 4τt ≤ 0. Q.E.D.
A.2.5 Steady-State Equilibrium
Lemma 13. If there exists a Markov-Perfect Coalitional Equilibrium in each period t + s, for
all s ≥ 0, then (i) an equilibrium for the OLG model at time t exists . Moreover, if ϕt+s = ϕ
for all s > 0, then (ii) there is an equilibrium that always converges to a steady-state. Lastly, if
σmt = σ
n
t = σt, then (iii) the political equilibrium at time t is independent of the previous political
choices and the economy converges immediately to the steady state after a shock.
Proof. Fix the value of the parameters. (i) Notice that if a Markov-Perfect coalitional equilibrium
exists in each period t+ s (Lemma 6), then an equilibrium of the OLG model also exists because
it is simply a sequence of such temporary equilibria. Q.E.D. (ii) The equilibrium political choice
at time t depends uniquely on the value of the state gt. Notice that gt depends on the parameters
lt−1, σmt , σ
n
t and on the choice variable Mt−1 but is is independent of anything else. This implies
that the evolution of g depends uniquely on the evolution of M if l, σm, σn are constant over
time. Notice that if σmt = σ
n
t = σt then the political equilibrium at time t is independent of
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the previous political choices because the state gt is independent of history: gt =
lt−1
σt
= g∗,
which implies in turn that the economy converges immediately to the steady state after a shock.
Also notice that in this case the equilibrium is independent of the lagged value Mt−1, hence
the steady-state is unique. If σmt > σ
n
t then this is no longer true and the convergence may
take several periods. Finally notice that at constant parameters if gt+s = gt+s+1 for some t+ s,
then gt+s+u = gt+s for all s > 0, i.e. gt+s = gt+s+1 is sufficient for a steady state. Suppose
a steady state does not exists, i.e. gt+s 6= gt+s+1 for all s ≥ 0. If gt+1 > gt (<) then the
pivotal voter θvt+1 ≤ θvt (≥) which using Theorem 9 implies M∗t+1 ≤ M∗t (≥). This implies in
turn that gt+2 ≥ gt+1(≤). If gt+2 = gt+1 then we have reached a steady state. If instead
gt+2 > gt+1(<) the process continues recursively. There are three possibilities. Either (1) the
process stops because gt+s = gt+s+1 and a steady state is achieved, or (2) the process converges
to some gss. Else, (3) suppose that gt+s+1 − gt+s > 0 (<) for all s ≥ 0. if this is true, then
the process implies M∗t+s+1 < M
∗
t+s(>) for all s ≥ 0. Because the direction of this iterative
process is monotonic (increasing or decreasing), if it does not converge to some Mss, then it this
implies that if M is unbounded it will diverge to −∞ (+∞). But Mt ∈ [M,M ] by assumption,
hence the process must stop at M∗t+s = M (M) for some s ≥ 0. Notice that monotonicity under
case (3) implies gt+s+1 − gt+s > 0 (<) and therefore M∗t+s+1 < M∗t+s(>), but this is impossible
because M∗t+s = M (M). Hence, M
∗
t+s+1 = M (M), which means M
∗
t+s+1 = M
∗
t+s and implies
gt+s+1 = gt+s. Hence the system has achieved a steady state, and this leads to a contradiction.
Q.E.D. (iii) Straightforward from (ii) and Lemma 6. Q.E.D.
Theorem 7b. The long-run effect of an increase in lt−1 on the immigration policy has same sign
as the short-run effect and a weakly larger magnitude. If gt ≥ gˆ then the effect on immigration
policy is (weakly) negative and the effect on the public spending and the tax rate is strictly positive.
Proof. If at time t the “Budget Effect” prevails, i.e. Mt ≥ Mt−1, then gt+1 ≤ gt and θvt+1 ≥ θvt
by Lemma 6. Using Theorem 2 one gets Mt+1 ≥ Mt and Yt+1 ≤ Yt. Notice that this is implies
recursively θvt+s+1 ≥ θvt+s and therefore Mt+s+1 ≥Mt+s and Yt+s+1 ≤ Yt+s for all s > 0. Hence
I can conclude that at the new steady state Mss ≥ Mt ≥ Mt−1 and Y ss ≤ Yt but Y ss R Yt−1,
which means that the long run effect of an increase in lt−1 is positive on the openness of the
immigration policy and ambiguous on the public spending variable, which increases at the time
in which the shock occurs and falls in the following periods. Similarly one can show that if at
time t the “Political Effect” dominates, then at the new steady state Mss ≤ Mt ≤ Mt−1 and
Y ss ≥ Yt ≥ Yt−1.
Theorem 8b. The long-run effect of a decrease in the growth rate of the native population is a
weak decrease in the openness of the immigration policy and a weak increase in spending in the
imperfect Public Good and in the tax rate.All the effects have weakly larger magnitude relative to
the short-run effects.
Proof. Similar to the previous case.
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8 B Proofs: Extensions and Welfare Analysis
Appendix B includes the proof to the results regarding extensions in section 4 of the paper and
of the Welfare results in section 5. Moreover, it provides a formal description of the setup in the
case of “Elderly goods” informally described in section 4.4.
B.1 Partially funded pension system
Theorem 16. The effect of a marginal decrease in the size of the public pension system in
the short run is an increase in the restrictiveness of the immigration policy. In the long run,
the effect is an increase in restrictions to immigration and an increase in public spending in the
imperfect Public Good. The total effect on the tax rate is ambiguous.
Proof. It is sufficient to show that the objective function V i,yt (V˜t
i,y
) satisfies the SCP in α (γ).
Calculate the cross derivatives of V i,yt (V˜t
i,y
) with respect to Mt,Yt (et) and the parameter α
(γ).
V˜ i,yMtα =
θitlt−1
(1−M∗t )
+
βlt(σ
m
t − σnt )
(1−M∗t+1)
≥ 0
and V˜ i,yYtα = 0,V˜
i,y
etα = 0. Hence given a subset Φ
j
t defined as in C.5.1 with ϕj,t = α (γ), one can
show that V˜t
i
satisfies the SCP with respect to (xt;ϕt) and to (zt;ϕt) with zt = (x1t,−x2t−x3t).
Using Theorem 3 this implies that the short-run effect of a fall in α (γ) is 4Mt ≤ 0. In the long
run the effect of a weak fall in Mt is a rise in gt, which implies in turn a “political effect” at time
t + 1 with 4Mt ≤ 04Yt ≥ 0, which implies recursively the same effect for all the periods after
t+ 1 until the economy converges to a new steady state. Notice that the effect on the tax rate is
ambiguous at time t because of a simultaneous reduction of the total cost of pension (as α falls)
and of the workforce (because of the fall in Mt), while from time t + 1 the tax rate increases
until a new steady state is achieved, because of the fall in the workforce and the rise in public
spending. Therefore the overall long-run effect is ambiguous. Q.E.D.
Theorem 18. The effects of an increase in the longevity of the retired population lt−1 and /or of
a decrease in the growth rate of native population σnt−1 is a weak increase in the public spending
in education per child et.
Proof. Straightforward from A.2.1 and A.2.2.
B.2 Services for the elderly (“elderly goods”)
Suppose that the elderly consume a different private good, for instance home care, denoted by Ot
while the young consume the private good Ct. The good Ot is produced with the same technology
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as the consumption good Ct and the imperfect public good Yt, but only the immigrant workers
are capable of producing it. For simplicity I assume that there is no cost of immigration, i.e.
λt = 0, that the default immigration is M̂t = 0 and I analyse the case in which σ
m
t − σnt is
arbitrarily small. Also assume that the functions a(Y ) and d(Y ) are such that −a′′a′ Y ≥ 1 and
−d′′d′ Y ≥ 1 for all Y in the policy space. There are two possibilities. If at the equilibrium
there are enough immigrant workers, then the segmentation of the labour market is irrelevant
and the results are identical to the baseline model. The perfect substitutability in production
and the perfect competition ensure that all prices are are unaffected by immigration choices.
The implications change dramatically if in the proximity of an equilibrium there are not enough
immigrant workers to satisfy the demand at the constant price. In detail, the total demand of
services for the elderly is given by:
OTDt =
p¯t−1lt−1nt
P ot
=
(α+ γ)lt−1nt
P ot
Suppose that all the immigrants endogenously select themselves into the sector that produces Ot
(this is the case if wages are higher in this sector), then the total supply is given by: OTSt = ξmt¯t,
and the equilibrium price of the elderly good POt is P
O
t =
(α+γ)lt−1nt
ξmt¯t
. The zero profit condition
implies that the total revenue in the elderly good sector must be equal to the total cost, thus one
gets a different wage wOt in this sector, namely w
O
t =
(α+γ)lt−1nt
mt¯t
, such that the total nominal
income of the workers in the elderly good sector is wOt ¯tmt = (α + γ)lt−1nt. Notice that the
perfect substitutability in production between the consumption good and the imperfect public
good, together with the zero profit condition still imply PCt = P
Y
t = Pt (else only one of the two
would be produced and the result would still hold). Hence, in order to solves for the wage of the
native workers, we can use the total demand of consumption and imperfect public good. Using
the budget constraint one can show that (Ct + Yt)
TD =
wCt ¯tnt
Pt
. Because the total supply is
ξnt¯t one can solve for the price Pt = w
C
t /ξ. The zero profit condition for the production of the
consumption good holds for all prices Pt, namely Ptξnt¯t − wCt ¯tnt = 0. Hence I can normalize
Pt = 1 (this means that good C is the nume´raire) and I get the wage w
C
t = ξ. A competitive
equilibrium of this kind exists only if wOt ≥ wCt . In this problem this condition is equivalent
to: p¯t
(
1−Mt
Mt
)
≥ ξt¯t. Notice that as long as positive pensions are paid, one can always find Mt
small enough that such inequality is satisfied. I can now state the formulas for the consumption
of young and old individuals.
Ci,yt = (1− τt)ξit
and
Ci,ot =
[α+ γ(it−1/¯t−1)]σ¯t−1ξ
(α+ γ)lt−1
Mt
1−Mt
Finally notice that the government budget constraint is now different because the immigrants
have different wages relative to the natives. In order to keep the problem tractable it is useful
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to define a new variable Y˜t =
Yt
(1−Mt) . In detail:
τt =
Y˜t
[ξ¯t + (α+ γ)lt−1]
+
(α+ γ)lt−1
ξ¯t + (α+ γ)lt−1
The objective function of a young individual becomes:
V i,yt = (1−τt)ξit+a[Y˜t(1−Mt)]−c(Mt)+βlt
{
[α+ γ(θi,yt )]σ¯tξ
(α+ γ)
M∗∗t+1
1−M∗∗t+1
+ d[Y ∗∗t+1]− cˆ(M∗∗t+1)
}
where θi,yt = y
i
t/y¯t. Notice that the assumption of σ
m
t − σnt arbitrarily small implies that M∗∗t+1
is unaffected by current policy choices. Thus, the first derivatives are:
V i,yMt = −a′[Y˜t(1−Mt)]Y˜t − c′(Mt) < 0
V i,y
Y˜t
= a′[Y˜t(1−Mt)](1−Mt)− ξθ
i,y
t
ξ + (α+ γ)lt−1/¯t
Regarding the elderly, they have an objective function in the form:
V i,ot =
[α+ γ(it−1/¯t−1)]σ¯t−1ξ
(α+ γ)lt−1
Mt
1−Mt − cˆ(Mt) + d[Y˜t(1−Mt)]
Notice that
V i,oMt =
[α+ γ(it−1/¯t−1)]σ¯t−1ξ
(α+ γ)lt−1(1−Mt)2 − cˆ
′(Mt)− d′[Y˜t(1−Mt)]Y˜t
and
V i,o
Y˜t
= d′[Y˜t(1−Mt)](1−Mt) > 0
One can notice that in this case the young individuals are more hostile to immigration and to
public spending than the elderly. Using the same method presented in the paper, one can define
a common objective function V it = V (xt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt) by setting θ
i
t = θ
i,y
t = 
i
t/¯t for the young
individuals and θit = −it−1/¯t−1 for the elderly. Moreover I apply the increasing transformation
V it = (1 + θ
i
t)V
i,y
t for all young individuals and (κ − θit)V i,ot with κ arbitrarily large (these
transformation do not affect the preferences). Define zt = (−Mt,−Y˜t). I can show the following
results.
Lemma 23. (i) If lt−1 is small enough, the function V it satisfies SM and SSCP in (zt; θ
i
t).
Therefore (ii) a coalitional equilibrium exists.
Proof. (i) It is easy to show that V i,o
Mtθit
< 0 and V i,y
Y˜tθit
> 0 for all Mt, Yt, θ
i
t. Because V
i,y
Mt
< 0 and
V i,o
Y˜t
> 0 for all Mt, Yt, θ
i
t, then the SSCP is satisfied within the young and within the elderly
respectively. Lastly, one need to show that V (z′t; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt)− V (z′′t ; θit, ϕt, gt) > V (z′t; θjt , ϕt, gt)−
V (z′′t ; θ
j
t , ϕt, gt) for all z
′
t ≥ z′′t and z′t 6= z′′t and whenever i is a young individual and j is an
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elderly. Notice that for lt−1 arbitrarily small V
i,o
Mt
> 0 for all Mt, Yt, θ
i
t. Hence V (z
′
t; θ
j
t , ϕt, gt)−
V (z′′t ; θ
j
t , ϕt, gt) is strictly negative and because κ is arbitrarily large, the condition is satisified
for all Mt, Yt, θ
i
t. (ii) Straightforward from Theorem 3.
Theorem 20. If gt ≤ 1 then at the equilibrium, if it exists, the immigration policy is Mt = 0,
else a positive level of immigration is possible.
Proof. If gt ≤ 1 and an equilibrium exists, then the pivotal voter is a young individual with
V i,yMt < 0. Hence her ideal policy is Mt = 0.
Further details and additional results for this extension are provided in the supplementary online
material.
B.3 Welfare Analysis: Immigration Policy
Theorem 21. For any Social Welfare Function SWF (xt;ϕt, gt) that assigns a strictly positive
weight to each native individual of working age, there exist a threshold gˇt ∈ [0, 1] such that if
gt ≥ gˇt then a marginal tightening in the immigration policy caused by a change in the equilibrium
outcome reduces the Social Welfare.
Proof. Notice that the theorem above is stated for the baseline model without endogenous ed-
ucation. Here I show the proof for the full model with SWF denoted by SWF (xt;ϕt, gt) =
S˜WF (Mt, Yt, et;ϕt, gt) for xt = (Mt,−Yt,−et). The proof of the baseline model is straightfor-
ward. Define the overall weight of each generation as follows:
θ¯tˆ
0
µyt (θ
i
t)qt(θ
i
t)dθt
i = µy
θ¯t−1ˆ
0
µot (θ
i
t−1)qt−1(θ
i
t−1)dθt−1
i = µo
θ¯t+1ˆ
0
µyt+1(θ
i
t+1)qt+1(θ
i
t+1)dθt+1
i = µc
Normalize µy = 1 and assume µy + µo + µc = µ with 0 < µ < ∞. This can be done without
loss of generality under the assumption that µyt (θ
i
t) > 0 for each native individual of working
age. Suppose the equilibrium policy x∗t is such that M t < Mt < M t, which implies that a
marginal opening in the immigration policy is feasible. If the difference between the marginal
social benefit for the society from an increase in Mt and the marginal utility of Mt for the pivotal
60
voter evaluated at the equilibrium policy vector is strictly positive, i.e.
W˜DMt(M
∗
t , Y
∗
t , e
∗
t ;ϕt, gt) = S˜WFMt(M
∗
t , Y
∗
t , e
∗
t ;ϕt, gt)− V v,yMt (M∗t , Y ∗t , e∗t ;ϕt, gt) > 0
then a marginal increase in the openness of the immigration policy Mt is, ceteris paribus, ben-
eficial for the society. Notice that if M t < Mt < M t, then V
v,y
Mt
(M∗t , Y
∗
t , e
∗
t ; θ
v
t , ϕt, gt) = 0 from
the F.O.C. The social benefit for the society from an increase in Mt is given by:
S˜WFMt =
θ¯tˆ
0
µyt (θ
i
t)V˜
y
Mt
(M∗t , Y
∗
t , e
∗
t ; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt)qt(θ
i
t)dθ
i
t+
θ¯t−1ˆ
0
µot (θ
i
t−1)V˜
o
Mt(et,Mt, Yt; θ
i
t, ϕt, gt)qt−1(θ
i
t−1)dθ
i
t−1+
+
θ¯t+1ˆ
0
µyt+1(θ
i
t)E[V˜
y
Mt
(Mt+1, Yt+1, et+1; θ
i
t+1, ϕt+1, gt)]qt+1(θ
i
t+1)dθ
i
t+1 =
First of all notice that the linearity in consumption of the utility function implies
E[V yMt(Mt+1, Yt+1, et+1, ; θ
i
t+1, ϕt+1, gt+1)] = V
y
Mt
(Mt+1, Yt+1, et+1; θ¯t+1, ϕt+1, gt+1)] hence´ θ¯t+1
0
µyt+1(θ
i
t+1)E[V
y
Mt
(Mt+1, Yt+1, et+1; θ
i
t+1, ϕt+1, gt+1)]qt+1(θ
i
t+1)dθ
i
t+1 =
E[µyt+1(θ
i
t+1)]V
y
Mt
(Mt+1, Yt+1, et+1; θ¯t+1, ϕt+1, gt+1). Moreover, notice that a change in xt only
affects the future generation through a fall in gt+1, which has no effects neither on the budget
constraint at time t + 1 nor on the preferences of an individual (it only affects the political
equilibrium at time t + 1). Therefore V yMt(Mt+1, Yt+1, et+1, ; θt+1, ϕt+1, gt+1) is independent of
Mt and therefore SSCP implies: V
y
Mt
(Mt+1, Yt, et+1; θ¯t+1, ϕt+1, gt+1) ≥
V yMt(Mt+1, Yt+1, et+1; θ
v
t+1, ϕt+1, gt+1) as long as θ
v
t+1 ≤ θ¯t+1. I use the latter result and I
substitute the formulas for V i,yMt , V
i,o
Mt
into W˜DMt , and I can write the following inequality:
W˜DMt ≥
[
(α+ γ)
lt−1
(1−M∗t )
− λt +
(
βltγ
(1−M∗t+1)
− et
)
(σmt − σnt )
] θ¯tˆ
0
θitµ
y
t (θ
i
t)qt(θ
i)dθt
i − θvt
+
−c′(Mt)
θ¯t−1ˆ
0
µot (θ
i
t−1)g(θ
i
t−1)dθ
i
t−1 =
Notice that:
V v,yMt = −c′(Mt) + θvt (α+ γ)
lt−1
(1− M̂t)
− θvt λt +
(
βlt
(1− M̂t+1)
(α/θvt + γ)− et
)
(σmt − σnt )θvt
also represent the FOC of the optimization problem of the pivotal individual. This implies that
if at the equilibrium M t < Mt then:
(α+ γ)
lt−1
(1− M̂t)
− λt +
(
βltγ
(1− M̂t+1)
− et
)
(σmt − σnt ) ≥
1
θvt
(
c′(Mt)− αβlt(σ
m
t − σnt )
(1− M̂t+1)
)
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Define the weighted average
Egt(µ
y
t θ
i) =
θ¯tˆ
0
λyt (θ
i
t)θ
i
tgt(θ
i
t)dθ
i
t = hgt
θ¯tˆ
0
θitg˙t(θ
i
t)dθ
i
t = hgtEg˙t(θt)
for some p.d.f g˙t. Notice that hgtEg˙t(θt) > 0 under the assumption that µ
y
t (θ
i
t) > 0 for each
native individual of working age. Therefore we can state the following inequality:
W˜DMt ≥
(
c′(Mt)− αβlt(σ
m
t − σnt )
(1− M̂t+1)
)
hgtEg˙t(θt)− θvt
θvt
− c′(Mt)µo
The F.O.C.s of the pivotal individual plus the assumption that immigrants are not net benefi-
ciaries (in expectation) of the fiscal system imply c′(Mt)− αβlt(σ
m
t −σnt )
(1−M̂t+1)
> 0 for M t < Mt < M t.
Finally notice that because of a previous assumption c′(Mt) <∞ and that µo < 0 imply:
lim
θvt→0+
(
c′(Mt)− αβlt(σ
m
t − σnt )
(1− M̂t+1)
)
hgtEgˇt(θ)− θvt
θvt
− c′(Mt)µo = +∞
Therefore, given a certain distribution of weights, either W˜DMt(M
∗
t , Y
∗
t , e
∗
t ;ϕt, gt) > 0 for all
θvt > 0, else the Intermediate Value Theorem implies the existence of a threshold 0 < θˇt < θ¯
such that W˜DMt(M
∗
t , Y
∗
t , e
∗
t ;ϕt, gt) = 0. This threshold is always meaningful because I have
previously assumed that the distribution of θt is such that q(0) > 0 and therefore θ
j
t = 0.
Moreover, W˜DMt(M
∗
t , Y
∗
t , e
∗
t ;ϕt, gt) is strictly decreasing in θ
v
t because W˜DMt is independent
of θvt and V
v,y
Mt
is strictly decreasing in θvt because of the SSCP. Therefore if the wage distribution
is such that θvt < θˇt then W˜DMt(M
∗
t , Y
∗
t , e
∗
t ;ϕt, gt) > 0 which implies that it would be welfare
improving to increase Mt. Lastly, because of Lemma 6 (iii), a threshold gˇt ∈ [0, 1] exists, such
that if gt ≥ gˇt iff θvt < θˇt, which implies the result stated. Q.E.D.
B.4 Alternative assumption about the default policy: Status quo
One may want to assume that the default platform is the policy implemented in the previous
period (if feasible) In such case, x0t = x
∗
t−1. Following the same steps described in the proofs
to Theorem 1 in Dotti (2015) one can show that there is no equilibrium in which a platform
xt ∈ Xt such that xt ∈ M(vt) is implemented. Neverthless, given that the default policy under
this alternative assumption may not be the least preferred option for some players, then there
may additional possible outcomes. Specifically, there may be (i) equilibria in which no coalition
is active and the default policy is implemented and (ii) situations of instability, in which some
coalitions are active only in order to prevent the victory of some other candidate. This may be
possible because of the assumption that, if no Condorcet Winner exists in the final stage of the
voting game, then x0 is implemented. Suppose that is the case. The characterizations of all the
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equilibria given in Theorem 3 is no longer valid. Neverthless, the compartative statics results
in Theorem 4-5 still apply. The reason is that in both cases (i) and (ii) the default option is
implemented, i.e. x∗t = x
0 . Given that the default option is assumed to be the status quo, i.e.
x0t = x
∗
t−1, this implies that the comparative statics is null, i.e. x
∗
t = x
∗
t−1 and therefore the
outcome is nondecreasing in θvt and ϕt as stated in the Theorems 4-5.
B.5 High tax rate
In section 3 we have restricted the policy space in such a way that for all xt ∈ X the tax rate
is internal 0 < τt < k < 1. Suppose that this assumption fails and at an equilibrium τt = k.
In this case it is not straightforward to derive results in the full model. Nevetheless, some
results can be obtained in the baseline model with xt = (Mt,−Yt) under the assumption that
d′(Yt) ≤ b′(Yt) for all Yt ∈ [0, Y ] and cˆ′(Mt) ≥ c′(Mt) for all Mt ∈ [0,M ]. If τt = k the policy
space is unidimensional, thus the traditional Median Voter Theorem applies if voter preferences
satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees condition. Consider the slope of the indifference curve of an working
age individual i:
MRSi,yMt,Yt = −
(
βlt
(1−M̂t+1)
(α/θit + γ)
)
(σmt − σnt )θit − c′(Mt)
b′(Yt)
and its derivative with respect to θit:
∂MRSi,yMt,Yt
∂θit
= −
βltγ
(1−M̂t+1)
(σmt − σnt )
b′(Yt)
≤ 0
Moreover, notice that the MRS of any retired individual is given by MRSoMt,Yt =
cˆ′(Mt)
d′(Yt)
, which
implies that MRSoMt,Yt ≥ MRSi,yMt,Yt for all i. Thus, preferences satisfy the Spence-Mirrlees
condition, and standard results can be applied to make predictions about the effects of changes
in the pivotal voter on the equilibrium outcome. The results differ from the ones of most Benefit
Adjustment Models. Specifically, an increase in the relative share of the elderly implies, ceteris
paribus, an fall in public spending and a reduction of the immigration quota. In this framework I
cannot derive analytical results about the effects of a rise in life expectancy, because this kind of
shock typically involves not only a change in the pivotal voter but also in the position and slope
of the budget constraint, such that the sign of the overall effect cannot be determined using the
Spence-Mirrlees condition only.
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Figures
Figure 1: Share of Population of Age 65 or Older
Evolution of the share of population of age above 65 from 1950 to 2015 and the forecast for the
next decades (source: United Nations, 2015).
Figure 2: Trends in Migration Policies
Comparison of the value of the index of tightness of immigration policies proposed by Boeri and
Brucker (2005) in 1990 and 2005 for 12 European countries.
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Figure 3-4: Effects of income on the attitudes towards immigration
Relationship between income and attitude towards immigration (preferred number of immigrants) in a
Tax Adjustment Model (Fig. 1) and in a Benefit Adjustment Model (Fig. 2). Based on Facchini and
Mayda (2008).
Figure 5-6: Effects of age on the attitudes towards immigration
Attitude towards immigration (preferred number of immigrants) of different generations of voters in a
Tax Adjustment Model (Fig. 3) and in a Benefit Adjustment Model (Fig. 4). Based on Haupt and
Peters (1998).
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Figure 9-10: Long-Run Effects of an Increase in Life Expectancy
Parameters: σn = 1, σm = 1.5, before shock l = 0.6, after shock: l = 0.62.
Effects of a positive shock on the life expectancy of the elderly on the immigration quota Mt (Fig. 9)
and on public spending per worker Yt (Fig. 10).
Figure 11-12: Long-Run Effects of a Decrease in the Birth Rate of the Natives
Parameters: σn = 1.2, σm = 1.5,l = 0.6, after shock: σn = 1.
Effects of a negative shock on the birth rate of the native population on the immigration quota Mt (Fig.
11) and on public spending per worker Yt (Fig. 12).
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Figure 13-14: “Naive” vs. “Sophisticated” agents
Parameters: σn = 1, σm = 1.5, before shock l = 0.6, after shock: l = 0.62.
Effects of a positive shock on the life expectancy of the elderly on the immigration quota Mt (Fig. 13)
and on public spending per worker Yt (Fig. 14) for “naive” (dashed line) and “sophisticated” voters
(solid line).
Figure 15-16: Convergence to the Steady-State
Parameters: σn = 1, l = 0.6.
Effects of a temporary negative shock on gt (solid lines) and of a temporary negative shock on gt (dashed
line) for σm = 1.5 (Fig.15) and σm = 2 (Fig.16).
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